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
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
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The primary objective of any nation in the world is to provide its people with a safe, secure feeling and to protect its national sovereignty and territorial integrity. My country, the Republic of Zaire has been, since our first day of INDEPENDENCE on June 30, 1960, up to the present day a victim of several dramatic disconcerts that have greatly jeopardized our progress toward a better economic-social development. Because of my passion for my country, and my deep anxiety for our future, it is my sacred duty to elevate the INTENTION of everyone who will read this paper toward my country's security situation. I hope that each one will share my thoughts and will support either physically or morally the Republic of Zaire to strengthen its defense system capability, in order to prevent an obscure future. Zaire shall remain a land where all the Zairian people and other nationalities will continue to enjoy, without fear, a truly freedom, democracy and the benefits of our development programs and efforts.

USAWC MILITARY STUDIES PROGRAM PAPER

ANALYSIS OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY OF THE
REPUBLIC OF ZAIRE

AN INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT

by

Lieutenant Colonel Udjanga Ungeyi, Zaire

Colonel Donald O. Clark, (Retired)
Project Adviser

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U.S. Army War College
Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania 17013
29 March 1988

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ABSTRACT

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The primary objective of any nation in the world is to provide its people with a safe, secure feeling and to protect its national sovereignty and territorial integrity. My country, the Republic of Zaire has been, since our first day of INDEPENDENCE on June 30, 1960, up to the present day a victim of several dramatic disconcerts that have greatly jeopardized our progress toward a better economic-social development. Because of my passion for my country, and my deep anxiety for our future, it is my sacred duty to elevate the INTENTION of everyone who will read this paper toward my country's security situation. I hope that each one will share my thoughts and will support either physically or morally the Republic of Zaire to strengthen its defense system capability, in order to prevent an obscure future. Zaire shall remain a land where all the Zairian people and other nationalities will continue to enjoy, without fear, a truly freedom, democracy and the benefits of our development programs and efforts.

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ANALYSIS OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY OF THE REPUBLIC OF ZAIRE

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

When analyzing every aspect of Zaire's social, political, economic and security structure and development, it has appeared that since the first day of Zaire independence up to the present time, many African specialists think, and convey to the international public that there are enormous continual deficiencies in all aspects of this great and important nation located in the heart of Africa. In order to get a better picture of the situations in Zaire, it must be understood that the problems of young and less developed nations are different in every country in this category and far more different with those of industrialized nations. The international public perception of the character of the Republic of Zaire has been in most cases completely distorted and misled when some western publications state that this country lacks all the criteria applicable in the democratic system. The reality of the problems of Zaire have thus been framed for the most part without reference of its strategic importance to the African context within which Zaire's problems must be viewed, if they are to be well understood. This is not to suggest that Zaire, as other countries of the world, does not have serious internal problems that require particular attention, especially in economic and social fields. It is important to observe that when making the assessment of the matters concerning African realities one must consider them as they are presented and not decide or prefer on how they must be. The crucial fact that must be born in mind is that Zaire has remained fully committed to the West since it became independent in June, 1960, in spite of its economic and social difficulty of the present period. The relentless campaign of calamity being

carried about it, not only in the Third World whose generally pro-Soviet stance it has long rejected, but in the Western countries as well. This in itself is a tribute to the leadership and the determination of Marshal Mobutu Sese Seko, without whom Zaire would long ago have lost its unity as a nation with all the strategic implications that would have for the international security and all the Sub-Saharan Africa.

The Western strategists should fully appreciate the strategic importance of the Republic of Zaire in order to prevent the absorption of the entire region of Sub-Saharan Africa into a Soviet sphere of influence and control. The United States has important national security interests in the Sub-Saharan Africa and, in the case of Zaire, I would suggest that it should increase its security, economic and social assistance with priority in the sectors of education and health, because President Mobutu Sese Seko is committed to keeping our country out of the Soviet grip and is striving to build a strong united democratic nation in Central Africa. It is therefore imperative that the world perspective on Zaire and all of Africa should reflect an understanding of the Soviet activities in the African continent. This still remains of little interest to many people in the Western countries.

In the following pages, I will point out first how vital Africa is to the Western powers, and then give a better picture that shows the strategic importance of the Republic of Zaire in Central Africa and to the Western nations. My main concern in this work is to get the reader to realize that Zaire has been subject to several communist threats in the past, with the Eastern block military build up in its neighboring countries it can become a target once again. In order to avoid this threat, so the people of Zaire can work peacefully for the development of the country without worry, the only best solution would be the creation of a strong security and defense system.

To attain better security, Zaire needs maximum assistance from its Western friendly nations. This crucial assistance should not only include providing training and materials, but most important is helping Zaire use its natural resources for developing its own defense industry so that it may become self-sufficient in all fields.

CHAPTER II

AFRICA'S STRATEGIC ROLE IN THE WORLD AND THE SOVIET THREAT

To understand the strategic importance of Zaire, it is first necessary to examine all of Africa's strategic role in the world which has been greatly stricken by communist threat. For several years, since the discovery and the division of the African continent among European powers in 1886, Africa has historically been allotted five roles in great power strategic calculations:

- o as a physical obstacle or a resting point on the way to some important places in other continents;
- o as a defensive location to protect sealanes;
- o as a launching pad for attacks against other territories;
- o as a source of military supplies and industrial raw material;
- o as a surrogate terrain, where great powers compete symbolically, without bearing the full cost of destruction.

It has been known for several years that to Western European nations, Africa is a geographical obstacle whose bulk lies athwart direct sea-born lines of access to Asia. The maritime routes that were developed by Europeans, both around the Cape of Good Hope and through the Suez Canal, have been essential to European expansion and domestic economic development. They have outflanked the lands controlled by Islam and Muscovy in the Middle East, which otherwise would have dominated Western commerce and communication with the Far East. While from the perspective of Moscow, and particularly of the Middle Eastern powers, Africa historically has been a useful buffer, protecting them the leverage on European economic activities. Africa was and will remain way stations for the Europeans and also the Americans for trade with Asia first, and also the Middle Eastern countries. The Western control over Africa during World War II played an important role in supporting

allied military operations in the Middle East, as, in effect, air routes and sea routes of great strategic importance. At that time the U.S. Air Transport Command flew several thousand tons of supplies from the Continental U.S. via an extended route including some stops in the Caribbean, Natal, Brazil, Dakar, Kano, Khartoum and Cairo to eventual destination in the Middle East or even in South Asia. The African air transport activity declined in importance after 1944 when the United States opened an airfield in Azores and the Allies reasserted control over the Mediterranean. As a launching pad, the Europeans used ports on the African littoral that requires only the most minimal occupation. The occupation for defensive purposes indeed comes about principally to ensure that someone will not use the littoral for offensives. For the dominant sea powers of Portugal, England, Spain and France, denying an enemy the use of a African littoral was first more important then acquiring the land itself, inevitably, though, acquisition will appear to be the most secure method of denial even if it is also the most expensive. For those who would attack, however, acquisition of the coastline is essential, particularly if the attackers do not enjoy ascendancy over all maritime areas.

The most important strategic location of Africa was seen in World War II, when Germany and Italy used their North African colonial territories to interrupt Allied Mediterranean communication lines, and in turn the Allies used North Africa as a launching pad for the conquest of Italy and further advance in Germany. In the Nineteenth Century, once the European powers were established on the ground of Africa, they exploited and exported large quantities of African resources of strategic importance to use and further develop their countries and strengthen their military power. Also several hundred thousand black Africans were brought to the New World in America, where they contributed to the development of that continent. Some 188,000

African troops fought on the Allies's side in France during World War I, and 470,000 African troops were also engaged in World War II with around 100,000 (including troops from Zaire) took part energetically in the Burma Campaign.

Though mineral exportation from the countries of Southern Africa did begin in the 1880's, during World War II uranium from Zaire (then the Belgian Congo) helped to fuel the Manhattan project in making the first atomic bombs that were dropped on Nyagasaki and Hiroshima. Since then, African minerals have become a crucial strategic resource for Western advanced technology and war making potential. The layer of these minerals lies from the Zaire's copper belt southward to the Cape of Good Hope in South Africa.

Indeed, recent thinking, and even studies made by strategists show that since 1950, great powers realized this strategic importance of the African continent, where at the present time their rivalries have increased and in some way really hampered the security and the development of the whole continent, especially in the Sub-Saharan region.

Thus Africa came to play a role as surrogate terrain where great powers could play out their rivalries at less cost to themselves than would be in their own countries. During the colonial period, Africa was to the Europeans who were the only colonists a new frontier of opportunity where they could display their individual and national talents and prowess which led them to the social rise in their countries. Also by distinguishing themselves in Africa, most of the Europeans as colonists won honor, and brought their countries to win prestige in the councils of Europe, and last but not least in the entire international arena.

Before 1960, the Europeans had the absolute monopoly of decision over African problems. But now several great powers and the two superpowers are involved in the course of African problems. The question should be raised,

what will the great powers rivalries mean to Africa? Africans themselves must understand and take precautionary measures in order to bring an end to these continuous rivalries. These rivalries have made Africa a real military, political, economic and ideological site which has shown no signs of reversal since 1975. If this trend continues what will the consequences be for Africa? History suggests that the interaction of four factors can be determinant in bringing alterations in African life:

- o the state of African political activities;
- o African countries' changes in the military and industrial technologies;
- o African continent proximity to other areas of economic importance or to vital transport route to those areas and;
- o the distribution of military power on the African Continent among the great powers.

In reality, since the sixteenth century Africa has been an obstacle for less powerful nations and an important way station and launching pad for the dominant powers whose principal interests lay elsewhere. So long as they (great powers) were not seriously threatened, their military stations could be small and lightly armed and needed no significant strategic hinterland. Nevertheless, the key element of military strength on which strategic competition in Africa has depended is not the overall military balance among the powers as measured in size of armies, armaments or military budget but the much more specific ability to project effective force thousands of miles away from the metropole at a level that has some hope of effecting military outcomes. In the Congo (Zaire) crisis of 1960-1961, the Soviet Union quickly learned that it lacked the minimum level of interventionary power to be effective, even locally, in a military situation in Sub-Saharan Africa. The

lesson of the Congo (Zaire) kept tropical Africa out of direct power strategic confrontation until the Angolan War of 1975. By then the Soviet Union had acquired the military transportation capacity and effective intervention forces that allowed it to influence the war's outcome in the absence of a major military commitment from the western power. Therefore, in looking at what is happening today in Africa, some times it appears that the United States and her Western allies are not in total agreement as to what their perspective national economic and strategic interests and goals are concerning the continent. There is general concern not only among the NATO members, but also friendly nations of Africa to the United States that the USSR has become a more important military actor with its strong military foothold in Angola and Ethiopia, and its other ramifications in other countries of the continent. Unless the Western powers provide economic and military assistance to the pivotal countries such as the Republic of Zaire, Africa might remain for another extended period the weakest target, incapable of resisting internal or external threats sponsored by Eastern power. By these means, the West can help to reduce the threat of a Soviet inspired interdiction of raw materials to the West. But it must also be kept in mind that, in spite of increasing Soviet grip in Africa, the Western nations still continue to have competitive economic interests in those African nations offering the greatest profit potential. Meanwhile, the Soviet focus in Africa is mostly strategic. The USSR's wish and objective is to acquire naval and airbases in Africa to upgrade its role as one of world power. The Soviets also have a vested interest in diluting China's growing influence in Africa. The principal mechanism employed by the USSR to achieve its competitive trading position is to promote the growth of Marxist-oriented regimes such as in Ethiopia, Angola, Mozambique, Congo (Brazzaville), etc. The Soviet military assistance is thus

extended to friendly governments, to nationalist liberation movements, but also when circumstances dictate, even to potentially hostile countries. The Soviet interest in Africa is mainly a produce of geopolitical, strategic and ideological objectives sustained in major part by military assistance and minimal economic aid.

As we can see, Africa as a whole, and particularly its southern region, has become one of the most important theaters of contention between the Soviet camp and the West. Southern Africa attracts the USSR and its allies because of its inherent political vulnerabilities, which creates opportunities for Soviet sponsored influence, and because of its great value as a trading partner with the industrialized nations of the West. On the other side, the African based supply of strategically significant minerals represents a major vulnerability to the United States and to other Western nations as well. An interruption in the flow of some of these minerals would be a body blow to the United States economy and to the American and other western countries' positions in the world. The southern region of Africa has numerous minerals which are vital to the industrial development of large manufacturing economies. This region contains 95 percent of the free world's chromium, 86 percent of the world's platinum, 64 percent of its vanadium, 53 percent of its manganese, and 52 percent of the world's cobalt. Africa's southern region also produces important quantities of the world's gold and diamonds. The nations of this region which are particularly rich in minerals and have large deposits of them are listed as follows:

South Africa: Gold platinum group metals (six in all), fluorspar, manganese, chromium, asbestos, antimony, vanadium, diamonds, limestone, phosphates, vermiculine, iron ore, nicobium, tantalum, tungsten, molybdenum, uranium, and coal.

Zaire: Copper, diamonds, tin, colombium, tantalum, gold, tungsten, zinc, manganese, silver, coal, germanium, cobalt, and cadmium, cassiterite, wolframite, and monazite.

Zimbabwe: Chromium, nickel, copper, gold, and asbestos.

Zambia: Cobalt, copper, gold, and manganese.

Namibia: Diamonds, uranium, and copper.

Of these minerals, four are particularly significant to the United States and to other Western countries: chromium, vanadium, manganese, and the platinum group metals. The United States is more than 50 percent dependent on foreign sources for 23 of the 40 materials deemed critical to its national security. By contrast, the Soviet Union is totally independent of foreign sources for 35 of these same minerals. The Soviet Union is often a leading producer of the very same metals of which the United States relies on so heavily. The USSR, for example, is the world's foremost producer of refined zinc, nickel, and manganese. It is also one of the world's leading producer of cobalt and tin metal. To point out the important strategy of Africa as part of the Third World, early in 1921, Stalin wrote of the mineral rich areas of the developing world as the "Reserves of imperialism":

If Europe and America, may be called the front, the non-sovereign nations and colonies, with their raw materials, food, and vast stores of human materials should be regarded as the rear, the reserve of imperialism. In order to win a war one must not only triumph at the front but also revolutionize the enemy's rear, his reserves.¹

In pursuing the same ideal of denying the Western powers with natural resources, in 1973, Brezhnev stated that the Soviet aim was to gain control of the "two great treasures houses on which the West depends: the energy treasure house of the Persian Gulf and the mineral treasure house of Central and Southern Africa."²

Much in line with the statements mentioned above, there is the Lagovsky theory, named after the Soviet strategist A. N. Lagovsky. This theory holds that: "the West's reliance on imported mineral should be exploited in order to undermine its war making capability."³ It is plausible that the Soviets are carrying out this theory now in Africa, by their own actions as well their surrogate nations activities. The Eastern block and its ally Cuba have increased their activities in the Sub-Saharan African region by providing important military assistance to a country like Angola, and even the Popular Republic of the Congo. While the West claims that Soviet military materials cannot be used effectively by Africans who possess them, they remain a real threat to a country like Zaire which its Western friendly countries have been reluctant to supply with modern and sophisticated weapons and other military equipment. The Soviet (with Cuban and East German) policy in Africa is no longer simply opportunist in its pursuit of diplomatic influence. It appears clearly that in new Soviet policy much consideration has been oriented for the development of the capacity to build an empire of client-states beyond its adjoining borders in Eastern Europe (see Soviet presence in Angola, Mozambique, Ethiopia and the Popular Republic of the Congo). Somewhat differently from his predecessors, the Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev has been given a more prominent place on the Soviet global agenda to Africa

The indication of significant changes in Soviet Union's policy toward Africa was made by Jeune Afrique of March 5, 1986 as follows:

Whereas previous policy, articulated during the Brezhnev years by the chief party ideologist, Mikhail Suslov, and elaborated by the Soviet Foreign Ministry under Andrei Gromyko, did not accord great importance to ideological issues in underdeveloped Africa, the new policy takes a rather different approach to the matter. Moscow now recognizes that rapid urbanization in Africa, even without industrialization has created new circumstances - a new

social class open to ideological investment. Accordingly, the Soviet Union is going to accentuate its ideological and political support to progressive forces wherever pre-revolutionary conditions already exist. It is no accident that new translations of the sacred texts of Marxism-Leninism into Arabic, Swahili and several other vernacular languages of black Africa are starting to appear. And a plan aimed at increasing the number of foreign students in the Soviet Union and other East-bloc nations will reserve a privileged place for Africans.⁴

This analysis also concluded that the new Soviet approach may reflect the lessons learned from the Ethiopia experiment, in which an overtly Marxist and pro-Soviet state is saved from catastrophe of drought and famine by Western aid. This trend shows that by all means, the Soviet objectives are to maintain its ideological and political influence over a country while permitting the West to pay for it. Thus, this atypical intelligence has been carried on in Angola and Mozambique which have extensive commercial relationships with the Western powers, while remaining quite firmly within the pro-Soviet camp.

The strategy intelligently developed by Gorbachev for Africa is very articulated and bold, and can be considered in the following manner:

- o The Soviet Union is to play an active part wherever there is an ongoing ideological and political competition;
- o The access of the Western powers to the natural resources, particularly those of strategic importance, is to be blocked or diminished;
- o The creation of a social intellectual base in each country for developing a special relationship with the Soviet Union;
- o In those countries presently aligned with the United States, seek to establish normal diplomatic and economic relations while actively penetrating intellectual and other leadership circles.

THE CHINESE CONCERNS ABOUT AFRICA

The other major communist power that has been carrying out a smart and prudent policy in Africa is the Peoples Republic of China (PRC). If the PRC presence has been marked by circumspection today in Sub-Saharan Africa, its eyes, noses and ears are widely opened looking for an opportunity to jump in. One of the most important concerns of Red China in Africa since 1960 has been how to gain more friendship with African nations in order to counter the Soviet Union's influence in Africa. Its other national objective is to find feasible means of gaining the best possible access to important African mineral and agricultural resources. In addition, the votes of the African countries are of great importance to Red China in the United Nations and other world organizations. Realizing these important political and economic objectives in the 1960's, the PRC concentrated its revolutionary efforts on a few strategic areas that offered promise of an armed struggle against imperialism, colonialism, and neocolonialism such as the communist backed uprising in the Congo (Zaire) from 1960 to 1965 which was headed by Pierre Mulele, a Chinese-trained Zairian leader. Since 1970 the Chinese have changed their views on African problems.

The PRC has been pursuing a mission of strengthening its position in Africa and has established diplomatic relations with all African states except Swiziland, Malawi and South Africa. The Chinese see Africa today as an arena in which to thwart Soviet influence, and as a land that provides an opportunity to polish China's credentials as a Third World leader. For this reason in order to attain its objectives, since 1980, the PRC has been addressing its African policy which includes:

- o Efforts to counter Soviet dominance in countries such as Angola, Zambia, Mozambique, Congo, and Ethiopia.

- o Seeking prestige by presenting itself to Africans as mentor and moral leader in the Third World's struggle for economic development and national independence.

Although since 1970 until the present in the 1980's, the PRC goals in Africa are somehow parallel to those of the United States that stress the restoring and maintaining of political stability, economic development, and negotiable settlements in African matters. In regards to conflicts in Africa, the PRC had criticized the United States policy toward South Africa for Apartheid problems, it has consistently endorsed the position of African states looking for isolating completely South Africa politically and economically. There is doubt in the Chinese mind that the United States and USSR would cease to interfere in southern Africa problems, when looking at the scale of the two great powers involvements in the Angola Conflict, also in the situation of Namibia's Independence and South Africa racist system of Apartheid.

Today the PRC intention in Africa is clearly emphasized on the preventing of some African nations total reliance on the USSR for military and economic assistance. This is very noticeable in the Congo, Tanzania, and Zambia where the USSR has a very strong trade and military relationship, but which sometime gets shakened or weakened by CHINESE activities. The Chinese also provide several varieties of assistance including weapons to liberation movements, those especially fighting in South Africa against the white minority that refuses to integrate the black majority in the political life of South Africa.

The PRC is competing against the Soviet Union in Africa. As an African, I believe that the Chinese Communist Ideology is not much different from the

one that exists in Moscow. From 1961 to 1965, Red China and USSR supported the Zairian rebels who created conflicts that led to the death of more than 500,000 people in Zaire. If today the Soviet Union has a strong foothold in Angola, and China seems to be friendly to Zaire, I think that China can together once again with the Soviet Union support another communist or insurrectional movement that will create another disturbance in Zaire. Therefore the option is that a careful choice of relationships with the PRC is necessary whether in the military or economic fields. It is necessary then to keep in mind that China, with the largest world population, is not looking for the development of Africa, but it is looking primarily for a land where it can withdraw necessary resources (minerals and foods) to feed its people, and where in the future it might send some of its people to settle for exploiting Africa's natural resources. In dealing with the PRC we must always remember that the Chinese dogmatism states: "in an unfavorable situation the object is to continue struggling."⁵ Also after the crushing of the turmoil in Zaire in the 1960's, the Chinese declared:

The Congolese national liberation movement has suffered a setback as a result of U.S. imperialist intervention under the U.N. flag. . . . But the flames of the Congolese revolution can in no way be put out; the Congolese nationalists have learnt bitter lessons from the setback at the cost of bloodshed and are rallying their forces to wage a new struggle.⁶

If we have political stability today in Zaire, and maintain a good relationship with the PRC, the question that we should ask ourselves is what will happen tomorrow?

THE WESTERN POWER'S INTERESTS IN AFRICA

In assessing the Western power's interests in Africa, we must first determine the United States interests in Africa and then look at the Western

European role that remains very important since Europe was the dominant power in Africa from the 17th Century until the middle of the 20th Century.

Concerning the United States policy objectives in Africa, the United States has had a longstanding interest in the political evolution of the developing nations. In analyzing carefully the United States policy toward Africa, it is somehow easy to understand that the United States interests reflect moral concerns, as well as the political stability of the African states. Without having real vital interest in Africa, and especially in its Sub-Saharan region, the principal U.S. concerns in Africa can include:

- o Reducing the expansion of USSR, Cuba and their other communist allies in Africa;
- o Access to African key minerals for the Western industries;
- o Searching for a solution to African security and economic-social development.

The major concern at the present time is the presence of sizable, well-equipped communist forces, particularly from Cuba, East Germany, Czechoslovakia and North Korea, all backed by the USSR, that collectively represent the major security threat to many African states. While the majority of the communist military forces are in Angola and Ethiopia, communist civilian advisers and military in reduced number are present in several other African states. It would be wise to say that the presence of communist military forces in some African countries is not a direct threat to U.S. security. Therefore, an American military response to the Soviet-Cuban presence in Africa is unlikely because this presence has not yet endangered vital U.S. interests. The Cuban military presence in Angola with an estimated "40,000 troops,"⁷ may raise the questions about the security of the mineral resources of Southern Africa, notably in South Africa, Zimbabwe, and Zaire.

Angola, it is interesting to note, as the January 3rd, 1988 edition of the New York Times stated, has kept up oil exports to western countries, despite the presence of Cuban troops on its soil. Indeed, Cuban troops actually guard Gulf oil installation in enclave of Cabinda:

The United States does not recognize Angola's Marxist-Leninist government, citing the presence of more than 40,000 Cuban soldiers as obstacles. Though no diplomatic ties exists, trade between the two countries has flourished. The United States is Angola's largest trading partner, even giving it most-favored-nation status. Although Congress has frozen export-import bank loans to American projects there, the United States remains the largest simple source of foreign investment. Chevron and Texaco pump oil in Northern Angola. Conoco last year moved in new headquarters on Luanda's outskirts. Oil exports are the main reason for Angola's trade surplus with the United States, to the amount of six hundred forty-two million dollars in 1986. The dollars go largely for Angola's war effort, paying the Cubans' upkeep and for weapons from the Soviet Union and increasingly, from America's allies, including Belgium, Britain, France and West Germany.⁸

Nevertheless as the comment above points out, the United States considers that there are three important points in Soviet-Cuban relationships with African nations:

- o The Soviet Union and its allies lack the means and capability to make major investment in a developing nation, however because of Russians' reliance on defense industry, USSR can amply support conflicts.

- o The Soviet and Cuban military personnel are thousands of miles from their home bases and sources of military supply. Their supply lines which are extended over the Atlantic, the Mediterranean and the Middle East are vulnerable to attack by forces based outside Africa.

- o The United States may intervene militarily if the Soviet Union and its allies threaten to block the minerals or oil supplies to the Western power. Because of the above considerations, it is therefore possible that in case of

an out break of any conflict the United States will use its forces to perform the following missions in Africa:

- o Evacuation of American and other western civilians in African countries under going turmoil;
- o Rescue of hostages;
- o Display of forces to shore up friendly regimes;
- o Participation or support (in or of) international peacekeeping operations, and naval actions along Africa's coast to protect international shipping lanes.

These missions will be a very difficult task for the forces because:

- o In Africa, American teachers, engineers, missionaries, Peace Corps volunteers and other foreigners are dispersed outside major population centers.
- o Military rescue operations can cause violent reactions resulting in loss of life. It is estimated that thirty civilians were killed in Kisangani (then Stanleyville) in 1964, when Belgian paratroopers, transported in American planes, landed on a rescue mission. Nonetheless, there are significant numbers of Americans and Europeans in several African countries, at least more than 3,000 in the Republic of Zaire at the present time.
- o While only Kenya and Liberia are the only two countries with which the United States has especially cordial relations. Liberia is the only African country with a formal defense agreement with the United States. Nigeria, Zaire, Senegal, Gabon and some other states maintain a good and friendly relationship with the United States. It is therefore important to note that a country such as Zaire may have internal and external enemies, and it may be that the United States will wish to show its support only when the threats from its enemies become especially acute.

o The participation of U.S. armed forces in international peacekeeping operations in Africa is not likely but the United States will support other countries forces. This is because several African governments are particularly sensitive to great power actions that can be seen as imperialist or neo-colonialist and could involve the Soviets. An American military participation in peacekeeping operations would be so interpreted in many African capitals, with possible consequent harm to the peacekeeping effort and to the United States foreign policy. We should remember that even U.S. allies (France and Great Britain) did refuse to finance the U.N. Peacekeeping forces in the Congo crisis 1960-1963. In considering to establish U.S. bases in Sub-Saharan Africa, its very clear to me that the very low military profile assumed up today by the United States is adequate because political ideological consideration would prevent most African government from accepting an American military installation. However, it is conceivable that a few countries, under particular internal or external threats, might be willing to have U.S. military bases or large military missions.

Africa's leftist nations, who would see the presence of an American base as a brazen cooperation with the imperialism would probably work for creating turmoil in the countries that cooperate with the United States, by accepting the creation of U.S. military bases. To my best knowledge the infeasibility of establishing U.S. bases in Africa today is not a serious setback for American foreign policy, since there are few American objectives that would be served. A low military profile is probably essential at the present for the advancement of American political and economic objectives in Africa. U.S. military bases would generally promote hostility toward the United States and raise the level of threats toward pro-Western nations. If the United States wants access to African mineral supplies, as well as the African export and

investment markets, it cannot behave in a way that will recall African colonial experiences. Because of the Vietnam experiences, it also appears unlikely at the present that American public opinion could be brought to support U.S. military intervention in Southern Africa against a revolutionary upheaval, even if mineral supplies were threatened. If the threat to mineral supplies included Soviet and Cuban contingents, the situation would be more ominous for all concerned. In this circumstance, the United States might apply pressure on the Soviet Union and Cuba outside Africa and extend assistance short of armed intervention to local friendly forces. Whatever the American response might be, the political and military arguments against armed intervention on the African scene would probably still be persuasive, given the current U.S. national disposition against distant military activity. This assessment of the effectiveness of the low military profile of the United States in pursuing its political and economic objectives in Africa is based, and emphasized on current political realities in the United States and Africa. These realities might change in time if the USSR and Cuba decide to expand their systematic campaign of subversion and intervention in other African countries where there are important U.S. interests. The United States is in a fair position to use means other than military in achieving its foreign policy objectives in Africa. In reality, Africa today is in great need of the development capital, technology capabilities, and skilled personnel which the Western powers can implement to attain its objectives in Africa. Economic development assistance can of course be used to advance political and economic interests of the African continent. If American aid can be increased, its effectiveness for these purposes would in most instances be enhanced. Certainly the United States is able to offer Africa a valuable assistance in agriculture, industrial technology, education, health and other areas.

American capacity to help in these fields far exceed that of the Soviet Union and East Europeans and even West Europeans. Also, there is no doubt that to deter further Soviet and its allies actions in other African countries, the United States can expect to receive some assistance from its NATO allies. This mutual support was demonstrated when French forces helped the Republic of Zaire to repel the rebels based in Angola and backed by Soviets and Cubans, when they invaded the mineral rich Shaba Province in 1978.

To station American armed forces in Africa is considered at the present time counterproductive for American objectives. American objectives in Africa are for the moment better met by skillful diplomacy, economic and military assistance, and by other forms of cooperation with allied and friendly countries. Accordingly, the United States strategists' analysis is, when the United States armed forces must be used, bases outside Africa will be employed.

Africa is economically important to the United States primarily as a source of several key minerals. Eighteen percent of America's imported crude oil comes from Nigeria, making Nigeria the second most important source of imported petroleum after Saudi Arabia. Nigerian oil is economically attractive because of its low sulfur content, and politically attractive because it is only marginally entangled with the Middle East confrontation. There are also deposits of oil in Angola, Gabon, Congo, Zaire, and elsewhere along the West African coast. The Sub-Saharan African oil is currently estimated at less than four percent of the world total. The major U.S. strategic interest in Africa is with the 90 percent of the world deposited reserves of chromite in Southern Africa, representing about one half of the world reserves. Chromite is used in the production of stainless steel and other high quality ferro-alloys in which chromium is an essential ingredient.

It is generally agreed that the United States industrial economy would be severely damaged if chromite supplies become unavailable. The Southern African region is also an important supplier of gold, industrial diamonds, the platinum group metals, vanadium, manganese, and antimony, also its reserves of several of these minerals constitute a very large portion of the world's total. The United States imports other essential metals from various African countries including cobalt from Zaire, manganese from Gabon, bauxite from Guinea, and copper from Zambia. Clearly, the United States has a very strong interest in maintaining access to African minerals. However, in view of some uncertain situations or disagreements with African states, it is likely that from time to time the United States will find access to one or more of its African mineral supplies interrupted. Any increase in the price of the affected minerals and other economic dislocations would be catastrophic for the United States industry. In this case, the United States will turn to alternative suppliers which include the USSR or the use of natural or synthetic substitutes by recovering metals from scrap and drawing down the stock pile reserves. It is then very clear that if the USSR ever comes to be in a position of controlling the mineral sites in Africa and their cost on the international market, the Soviets would have succeeded in striking a blow that can greatly damage the American and Western European industrial base. Africa therefore remains vital for the supply of minerals to the United States and other Western Bloc countries. For not being cut off completely from the mineral market in Africa, the United States has been carefully pursuing those policies that recognize African nationalism as a force in Africa's political, economic and cultural growth.

In looking at the United States objectives in Africa, we must therefore understand that there are three major factors which are pursued by the United States:

- o Political. The support of governments responsive to the rights and needs of the African people and commitment to an orderly world, the peaceful settlement of disputes and constructive interacting among nations.

- o Economic. The support for the promotion of growth in the African economy by a steady effort of each nation.

- o Geopolitical. The enhancement for self-defense for the security of each nation.

The United States alone, by bearing the entire world security against the Russian threat, cannot do everything for other nations. We must therefore make our own efforts to improve our development in all the fields in order to maintain stability within our countries in Africa.

IMPORTANCE OF AFRICA TO EUROPE

To Western Europeans, Africa remains an area where they can still demonstrate the Western civilization. Economically, beside the United States assistance to European nations after the Second World War thru the Marshall Plan, Europeans depended heavily on Africa's rich natural resources and on its markets. Given its geographic proximity, Africa would continue to remain one of the European strategic thinking areas, which reasoned that Africa represents the likely route for a Soviet military challenge to European countries security. As it is well known that Africa has remained of greatest importance geopolitically to all European countries. Since 1978 only France has been very much concerned to play its role as a major European power over

African problems in a world now dominated by the United States and the Soviet Union.

As part of the complex pattern of relationship by which France sought to preserve European influence on the African continent, it must be considered that in the immediate post colonial period France signed two kinds of military cooperation agreements with African countries.

- o Bilateral defense agreement that permitted French troops to intervene militarily at the request of the African government in question. These type of agreements were signed between 1960 and 1963 with eleven former French colonies including: Central Africa, Gabon, Ivory Coast, Togo, and Senegal which remain in force until present day.

- o Since 1979 all the Francophone states signed military agreements under which France agreed to provide assistance and training to military and paramilitary forces. This agreement includes also Zaire, Burundi and Rwanda. The main reason for signing agreements between several African states and France is the African's concern over the potential threats to different countries coming from the communist forces in Angola, Ethiopia, the Congo and other pro-Soviet African nations. By virtue of the military technical cooperation agreements, the French have retained the role of the principal military equipment supplier to most of the African Francophone states. Despite this advantageous monopoly given to France for arms delivery to African states, it was estimated that between 1973 and 1977, French military shipments were around \$715 million of which \$455 million went to South Africa and Zimbabwe. (It is important to notice that French arms sales to South Africa were officially terminated in November 1977 after the U.N. Security Council instituted a mandatory arms embargo against South Africa.) Some \$130 million was accounted for the sale of Mirage fighters to Zaire, and the

remaining \$130 million was divided for deliveries of small arms and communication and transportation equipment for other African nations. At this period the qualities and the sophistication of French military equipment sold to African nations were questionable. It is only since 1978 that French arms transfers to African countries have significantly improved and increased in both quality and sophistication. If in Africa we are in need of weapons to maintain our external and internal securities, it remains for the French a significant political goal for maintaining French influence in Africa and counterbalancing other power relationships (particularly USSR) with African countries. If during the colonial period Europeans were capable of maintaining internal and external securities in their colonies in Africa, today the situations have become more complex. The Europeans, particularly the French, consider the Soviets and their allies' presence in Africa not only as a threat to African countries, but also to Western European nations. Africa is considered by European planners as a potential route for Soviet military advance against the southern flank of Western Europe. The Cuban intervention in the Angolan Civil War in 1975, supported by Soviet logistics and weapons, was no less alarming to African leaders than to European and especially to the French leaders. Because of several hostilities that had occurred in African countries between 1975 and 1978 and subsequently in Chad, Zaire, Western Sahara and the Horn of Africa, by 1978 France deployed more than 13,000 troops on the African Continent, operating in eight different countries, this is not counting more than 1,000 French military technicians and advisers stationed in several countries throughout the continent. The above indices reflect the increase in French concern over the security situation in Africa, especially since 1975. The same increased concern has been reflected in a series of statements by French officials and has also

found echo in the statements of several Francophone African leaders. Whereas, for example, the 1975 Franco-African summit conference in Bangui, the capital of the Central Africa Republic, was dominated by the discussion of aid, trade, and development issues, in 1976 in Paris, the meeting was overshadowed by security issues, even though these were not formally on the agenda. Reflecting the concerns of many of the assembled Francophone leaders over the implications of the 1975 Angolan Civil War, French president Valery Giscard d'Estaing told the final session of the conference that "only competition which is in accordance with Africa's interests is that which promotes economic, social, and cultural development."⁹ In 1977, when addressing the Francophone Summit Conference, in Dakar, once more President Giscard warned that Africa's aspiration for economic growth, development, and self-sufficiency could only be realized if there was stability and peace on the continent. "Over the past few years," he noted, "we have seen the dangers increase, not without concern on our part. Conflicts are multiplying, feeling of antagonism are becoming more and more entrenched, and Africa runs a growing risk of being caught up in conflicts which diverts its strength from the goal of development."¹⁰ Lending his endorsement to Article III of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) Charter on inviolability of national frontiers and territorial integrity, President Giscard concluded by affirming the conformity of French policy with African aspirations for independence and a middle road that is, between east and west, and by pledging French assistance to the development and security of African states, regardless of their ideological proclivities. These two main themes can be summarized in short as: No development without security. France has a commitment to assist African states militarily and economically for maintaining their security from all outside interferences.

From 1975, with increased Soviet-Cubans penetration in Africa, France has justified its military role in Africa first on the basis of its security and cooperation agreements with their former colonies, but more generally by reference to France's historical ties to and special affinities with the African continent. These French national and economic interests were stressed again by French Foreign Minister Jean Francois-Poncet in May 1974 when addressing the French Assembly:

There is undoubtedly no region of the world where the interests and sentiments of France are so profoundly engaged as in Africa. Linked to this neighboring continent by ties of history, geography and culture, and dependent upon it as it is upon Europe for its prosperity, and security, France pursues in regard to the continent a policy which is disinterested and courageous. . . . If the government has intervened militarily and with a determination everyone today recognizes, it has been to respond to the requests of weak and unarmed African states obliged to face attacks launched from outside. These actions, limited in scope and duration, have never any other goal than to permit that freely debated political solution might put an end to tensions and conflicts. The results have conformed to the intentions.¹¹

To prove its commitment to the security of African countries on March 8, 1977 when the Soviet and Cuban backed, Angolan based rebels attacked across the border into Zaire's Western Shaba Province, France provided 11 aircraft to assist in the airlift of Moroccan troops and equipment to Zaire. During the second attack on the town of Kolwezi where many foreigners such as mine workers, traders, doctors, etc. lived, French and Belgian governments independently reached the conclusion that direct military intervention was required to protect their citizens. French paratroopers landed in the north of Kolwezi on May 19th, 1978. The Belgians set limited objectives, they stopped at the Kamina Base and evacuated their estimated 4,000 citizens from the Shaba Province. Neither the French nor the Belgians were prepared to accept a long term security role. They made only a humanitarian intervention

to save their compatriots and other foreigners. By the end of May 1978, it was decided that contingents from the Ivory Coast, Morocco, Senegal, Togo and Gabon should replace the French legionnaires and the Belgian paratroopers in restoring peace and order in the Southwestern part of Zaire.

Since 1977, the French have intervened directly with military forces more than five times in Africa.

- o April 18, 1977 - Supporting Moroccan troops in Zaire.
- o May 19, 1978 - French legionnaires landed in Kolwezi in the Republic of Zaire.
- o March 27, 1978 - 1,500 French legionnaires and four squadrons of French dispatched to Chad to counter Frolinat and Libya threat.
- o June 1977 - French sent squadron fighters, bombers to aid Mauritania's government against Polissario.
- o From 1978 - French have increased their troops presence to more than 40,000 in Djibouti.
- o In September 1979 - French troops put President Francois Dacko in power in the Central Africa Republic, replacing Emperor Bokassa.

The costly French military involvement in Africa can be seen as constraints that limited resources have imposed on French military capabilities. Ever since de Gaulle, French African policy has been predicated on the maintenance of an effective and flexible French intervention force. But this objective has to contend with other more important to overall French policy objectives, in the competition for limited government resources. As the French policy identified the situation in 1976, the French look at their own security first:

the continued French commitment to a costly independent nuclear capability, including both land and submarine-launched missiles, which de Gaulle postulated as the cornerstone for French autonomy in foreign policy and which remains as cardinal article of faith across the entire French political spectrum; and (2) the equally

important commitment to the modernization of conventional military capabilities in Europe, with the rational goal of ensuring French security in the face of a potential threat from the Warsaw Pact and the less rational but nonetheless real preoccupation with the revival of German power on the Continent.¹²

Also, because of declining economic growth, inflation, and competing domestic priorities, French defense spending between 1964 and 1986 has consistently fallen short of project goals with no respect of significant improvement. As a result, the cost of military, France was not capable alone to support such operations in Zaire in 1978. Shortage in long range military transport aircraft forced the French to rely on the United States and chartered commercial aircraft for the transport of their men and equipment to Zaire. The parachutes used in the drop into the city of Kolwezi were borrowed from the Zairian armed forces.

In this foregoing analysis, I have attempted to show that even the political ideal proposed by the French leaders to state that France will do whatever it can to preserve African countries' security, as any other nations on earth, France has a lot of constraints that will not permit it to meet all its requirements. Therefore, all Africans must give a deep thought before appealing to any nation for military or economic assistance. The Europeans will continue to show their concerns about our continent, but in order to reach meaningful decisions on conflicts or the development of Africa, we as Africans should be responsible today and in the future for all the situations occurring in our continent.

ENDNOTES

1. U.S. Joint Chief of Staff, United States Military Posture, Fiscal Year 1982 (Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 1981), p. 8.

2. Capability of U.S. Defense Industrial Base, p. 460.
3. Gary Thatcher, "South Africa . . . How Vital to the West?", Christian Science Monitor, December 16, 1980, p. 13.
4. Jeune Afrique, March 5, 1986.
5. Survey of China Mainland Press, December 1, 1962.
6. Ibid.
7. Washington Post, January 9, 1988, p. A20.
8. The New York Times, January 3, 1988, p. 2E.
9. Le Monde, May 11, 1976, p. 1.
10. Le Monde, April 14, 1977.
11. French Government Information Ministry Press Release, May 1979.
12. Alan Ned Sabronsky, "French Foreign Policy Alternatives," Orbis 19, No. 4 (Winter 1976), pp. 1435-37.

CHAPTER III

STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF ZAIRE

As far as concerns the Republic of Zaire, a country known potentially as one of the richest nations in natural resources in the world, and sometimes called a treasure house, the geological scandal or a promised land with still large deposits of untapped minerals, has been envied by the communist bloc since it became independent on June 30, 1960. The Soviet Union together with its allies and their African puppets have tried on several occasions to disrupt the political organization and the unity of our country by providing assistance to some outlaw individuals and movements considered by the Zairian people as destabilizing elements.

The strategic and precious minerals found in Zaire are particularly important to the United States and its western allies. Zaire with its products of: 73 percent of world's cobalt, 78 percent of diamonds, 40 percent of its copper and also several other minerals previously mentioned in this writing, remains one of the largest suppliers of industrialized nations in the western sphere.

On the other part, the Republic of Zaire plays an important role of counterbalance to the growing Soviet influence in Sub-Saharan Africa. Our leader, President Mobutu Sese Seko, has been a staunch anti-communist in the region of Central Africa, and supporter of Western power policies in the world assemblies. Being a landlocked country with only 40 km (10.5 miles) of Atlantic sea coast, Zaire cannot be a maritime and naval power, however, there is no doubt that it can become an important ground and air power in Central Africa, and provide air facilities to western power. The importance of Zaire

as a strategic air support base was stressed in April, 1986 by U.S. military specialists when planning for the raid on Lybian terrorists bases:

At the time of the bombing of Tripoli and Benghazi in April 1986, Pentagon strategist proposed that the Zairian air base of Kamina should be used as a refueling point for U.S. bombers before their flight to Libya. This is the option which they hoped to use if the British government had refused to let the American bombers overfly their territory. It is evident that the Kamina Base has already become an essential part of U.S. policy in Africa.¹

This news shows clearly that in case of major conflict between great powers, Zaire can be of a vital importance not only for air bases, but also as logistics stockpile sites and even as a large assembly area for troops that might be sent from continental U.S. to Europe or to Middle East. The other assets that render Zaire important are its larger population number than in all the regions of Central Africa, and also the area it covers in the heart of Africa articulate that any stabilizing or conflicting situation in Zaire will be of great impact in Central Africa, and the rest of the Sub-Saharan region.

ENDNOTES

1. African Confidential, Vol. 28, "Zaire: Fly by Night," p. 3.

CHAPTER IV

THE NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY OF ZAIRE

In addressing his speech to the Zairian Parliament on June 21, 1978 Marshal Mobutu Sese Seko, President of the Republic of Zaire stated: "Since 1965, thanks to the consciousness that we have provided to all the population, Zaire had become a real oasis of peace," and he continued

This year of 1978 which has tolled the knell of the security of Zaire, when two countries, one from the Ural and other from the Caribbean, decided to establish in Luanda, against the unanimous will of the people, a regime framed to the image of their ambitions. Their only aim is to destabilize all the political regimes who refuse to submit to the ideological slavery. Since that, Zaire has suffered successively two aggressions in a unbeaten record, the insecurity does not come from Zaire, but knocks at its doors constantly. The degree seems to be more important. This is why, the security problem of our country overwhelms the limit of Zaire itself.¹

In this speech, the President was telling the world and the Zairian population that the rebels who had invaded Zaire twice once in March 1977 and again in May 1978 were trained and equipped by Cubans, East Germans and the Soviets with the Angolans' complicity. Consequently, the threat was not only from the Zairians exiled in Angola, but it was a joint, preplanned invasion from the Soviet Union and its surrogates. At several occasions the Soviet Union had already tried to destabilize Zaire by supporting groups and individuals who had plunged the country to bloodshed and turmoil which took lives of more than 500,000 people between 1960 and 1965. At that time, by supporting dissident groups, the Eastern bloc was trying once more to separate the region of Shaba from the rest of Zaire, to make it a secessionist state. A region that already had once, with the Belgian complicity, undergone secession from 1961 to 1963, and was brought back to be united with the rest of the country only with the effort of the United Nations Peacekeeping Forces

supported materially by the United States. With its limited military capability and its extremely long boundaries of in total 10.120 kilometers which result in sharing borders with nine countries that are listed in the following clockwise direction:

- o Congo (1,625 Km)
- o Central Africa Republic (1,577 Km)
- o Sudan (628 Km)
- o Uganda (764 Km)
- o Rwanda (217 Km)
- o Burundi (233 Km)
- o Tanzania (459 Km)
- o Zambia (2,017 Km)
- o Angola (2,285 Km)
- o and Enclave of Cabinda (an Angolan Province) (225 Km).

Zaire alone can not effectively maintain its external security with its forces that lack modern and sophisticated equipment, and the necessary logistic resources to support operations against aggressors backed by superpowers and its allies (USSR and other communist nations).

Although the Zairian National Security Policy is very clear and states:

The Zairian armed forces are not a force of aggression, whatever may be its strength and capability, the peaceful neighbors of Zaire should not have an apprehension. The objectives of the Zairian armed forces are first to preserve the internal and external security to the nation, and second to protect the good citizens and to pursue the criminals,²

until today Zaire still faces an enormous threat from outside. All the aggressions that had endangered the life of the Zairian population since 1960 until present had sanctuaries from the neighboring countries.

Since then there has been an extensive Soviet-Cubans military buildup, particularly in Angola and it is necessary to compare first the capabilities of the defense of the Republic of Zaire with those of its neighboring countries. The 1987-1988 military balance checklists below show that the Zairian defense is greatly outnumbered in conventional weapons and men by its neighbors, with largest forces being from Angola, Tanzania and Sudan:

(1) CONGO

GDP 1984: fr 920.10 bn (\$2.11 bn)
 1985: fr 985.43 bn (\$2.19 bn)
 growth 1984: 3.0% 1985: 1.0%
 Inflation 1985: 6.1% 1986: 5.6%
 Debt 1984: \$1.8 bn 1985: \$2.0 bn
 Def bdt* 1984: fr 21.60 bn (\$49.43 m)
 Def exp* 1985: fr 25.00 bn (\$55.65 m)
 \$1 = fr (1984): 436.96 (1985): 449.26
 fr = francs CFA

Population: 1,838,000
 18-30 31-45
 Men: 205,000 116,000
 Women: 210,000 135,000

TOTAL ARMED FORCES:

Active: 8,750.

Terms of service: voluntary (2 years).

ARMY: 8,000.

2 armd bns.
 2 inf bn gps (each lt tk tp, 76mm gun bty).
 1 inf bn forming.
 1 arty gp (how. MRL).
 1 engr bn.
 1 para/cdo bn.

Equipment:

Tks: 50: 35 T-54/-55, 15 Ch T-59.
 (Some T-34 in store.)
 It: 17: 14 Ch T-62, 3 PT-76.
 AFV: recce: 25 BRDM-1/-2.
 APC: M-3, 104 BTR (30 -50, 30 -60, 44 -152).
 Arty: how: 32: 75mm: 6 M-116 pack;
 76mm: 8 M-1942; 100mm: 10 M-1944;
 122mm: 8 M-1938.
 MRL: 8 BM-21.
 Mor: 82mm: 120mm: 10 M-1943.
 ATK: guns: 5 57mm. RCL: 57mm.
 AD: guns: 23mm: ZSU-23-4 SP;
 37mm: 28 M-1939

NAVY: + 250 (some women).

Base: Point Noire.

FAC(P): 6: 3 *Shanghai* II: 3 *Zhuk*
 (1 *Sheriden*, 3 *Pirana* HS non-operational).

Patrol craft, river: 8: 4 ANCOR (2 13-m Type
 43, 2 11.4-m Type 38), 4 *Yulin*.

Spt: 1 53-ft launch

AIR FORCE: 500:

21 combat ac, no armed hel.†
 FGA: 1 MiG-15, 20 MiG-17.
 Tpt: 1 F-28, 5 An-24, 1 An-26, 2 Il-14, 2 C-47
 (DC-3), 1 N-2501 *Noratlant*, 1 N-262 *Frégate*,
 2 MH-1521 *Broussard*.
 Trg: 4 L-39.
 Hel: 4 SA-315B/316C *Alouette* II/III, 1 AS-365
Dauphin.

PARA-MILITARY: 6,100:

Gendarmerie 1,400; 20 coys.
 People's Militia 4,700.

* Excl equipment.

† Spares are short; much equipment may be
 non-operational.

CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

GDP 1983: fr 139.0 bn (\$364.77 m)
 1984: fr 253.1 bn (\$579.14 m)
 growth 1984: 1.0%
 Inflation 1984: 9.1% 1985: 8.8%
 Debt 1984: \$300.0 m 1985: \$355.0 m
 Def exp 1983: fr 6.5 bn (\$17.06 m)
 FMA 1983: \$15.50 m
 \$1 = fr (1983): 381.06 (1984): 436.96
 fr = francs CFA

Population: 2,667,000
 18-30 31-45
 Men: 272,000 198,000
 Women: 288,000 215,000

TOTAL ARMED FORCES:

Active: 7,000 incl *Gendarmerie*.
Terms of service: conscription (selective),
 2 years; personnel have a Reserve
 obligation thereafter, term unknown.

ARMY: 4,000.

1 Republican Guard 'regt' (bn).
 1 territorial defence 'regt' (bn).

1 combined arms regt (1 mech, 1 inf bn).
 1 sp/HQ 'regt' (bn: engr, sigs, tpt coys).
 1 Presidential Guard bn.

Equipment:

Tks: 4 T-55.

AFV: *recce*: 10 *Ferret*. APC: 4 BTR-152, some 10
 VAB, 25+ ACMAT.

Mor: 81mm: 120mm: 12 M-1943.

ATK: RCL: 14 106mm.

River patrol craft: 9.

AIR FORCE: 300:

2 combat ac, no armed hel.

COIN: 2 R-235 *Guerrier* (?operational).

Tpt: 3 Douglas (1 DC-4 (VIP), 2 DC-3/C-47).

1 *Caravelle*, 1 *Corvette*, 8 AL-60, 6 MH-1521

Broussard, 2 Cessna 337 *Skymaster*.

1 AS-350 *Ecureuil*.

4 H-34 (*Sikorsky* S-58, ?operational).

PARA-MILITARY: some 10,000

Gendarmerie 2,700;

3 Regional Legions, 8 'bdes'.

Security Forces.

National Young Pioneers 8,000 (boys and girls
 14-18); unarmed, some elementary drill and
 discipline - status uncertain.

* All Soviet equipment probably unserviceable.

3

SUDAN*

GDP 1983/4c: £S 7.61 bn (\$6.82 bn)
 1984/5c: £S 10.40 bn (\$8.00 bn)
 growth 1985: -5.0% 1986: -7.5%
 Inflation 1985: 45.0% 1986: 38.0%
 Debt 1985: \$10.5 bn 1986: \$13.0 bn
 Def bdgt 1985/6: £S 875.00 m (\$350.00 m)
 1986/7: £S 1.10 bn (\$440.00 m)†
 FMA 1985: \$14.0 m 1986: \$6.0 m
 \$1 = £S (1983/4): 1.1164 (1984/5): 1.3000
 (1985/6/7): 2.5000

Population: 23,500,000

	18-30	31-45
Men:	2,700,000	2,300,000
Women:	2,635,000	2,450,000

TOTAL ARMED FORCES:

Active: 58,500.

Terms of Service: voluntary;
 (conscription legislated, not implemented).

ARMY: 54,000 (incl AD).

10 Regional Commands.

1 arm'd div HQ.

1 Republican Guard bde.

2 arm'd bdes.

10 inf bdes.

1 para bde.

3 arty regts.

1 engr regt.

Air Defence (3,000):

2 AA arty bdes.

1 SAM bde (3 btys) with SA-2.

Equipment:‡

Tks: 155 T-54/-55, 20 M-60A3.

Rt: 60 Ch Type-62.

AFV: *reco*: 6 AML-90, 15 *Saladin*, 50 *Ferret*,

BRDM-1/-2. APC: 40 BTR-50/-152, 30

OT-62/-64, 36 M-113, 100 *Walid*.

Arty: *guns*: 85mm: 12 D-44; 88mm: 40 25-pdr;

100mm: 20 M-1944; 122mm: Type-60;

130mm: 36 M-46 and Ch 59-1;

155mm: 11 Mk F-3.

how: 105mm: 18 M-101 pack;

122mm: 64 M-1938/Type-54/D-30.

MRL: 122mm: *Al Saqr*-30.

Mor: 81mm, 120mm: 100.

ATGW: *Swingfire*.

AD: *guns*: 20mm: M-167 towed, M-163 SP;
 23mm: ZU-23-2; 37mm: 120
 M-1939/Type-63; 40mm: 60 U/60;
 85mm: KS-12; 100mm: KS-19 towed.
 SAM: 20 SA-2, SA-7.

NAVY:‡ 1,500.

Base: Port Sudan.

Patrol craft, large: 7: 4 Yug PBR, 3 70-ton;

coastal: 4 10-ton; river: (3 reported).

Amph: LCT: 2 Yug DTM-221.

AIR FORCE: 3,000:

43 combat ac, no armed hel.‡

FGA/interceptor: 1 sqn with some 8 MiG-21.

FGA: 1 sqn with 8 J-5 (MiG-17 type), 6 J-6

(MiG-19 type), 10 MiG-17.

COIN: 1 sqn with 3 BAC-167 *Strikemaster*
 (?operational).

MR: 2 C-212.

Tpt: 1 sqn with 4 C-130H *Hercules*, 4 C-212.

3 *Mystère-Falcon* 20/50, 1 DHC-5D *Buffalo*,

6 EMB-110P2 *Bandeirante*.

Hel: 1 sqn with 20 IAR/SA-330 *Puma*.

10 BO-105, 4 AB-212.

Trg: incl 3 *Jet Provost* Mk 55 (?operational),

3 MiG-15UTI, 2 MiG-21U, 2 JJ-5 (2-seat

J-5), 2 JJ-6 (2-seat J-6).

AAM: AA-2 *Atoll*.

(On order: 6 J-6 frt, 2 C-130 tpt ac; 6 AB-212
 hel.)

PARA-MILITARY: 3,000:

National Guard 500; Border Guard 2,500.

OPPOSITION: Sudanese People's Liberation

Army (SPLA): ?20,000 org in bns; mainly

small arms incl 60mm mor, 14.5mm AA,

SA-7 SAM; arty reported; operating only in
 southern Sudan.

* Due to the internal security problems and the
 economic situation it is difficult to arrive at an
 accurate economic and defence profile.

† Excl £S 450 m for internal security.

‡ Eqpt serviceability questionable.

17.

UGANDA

GDP* 1984: sh 648.19 bn (\$1.80 bn)
 1985c: sh 1,200.0 bn (\$1.79 bn)
 growth 1984: -5.4% 1985: -5.5%
 Inflation 1985: 133.0% 1986: 177.3%
 Debt 1985: \$1.0 bn 1986: \$1.2 bn
 Def bdt† 1986/7: sh 15.28 bn (\$10.92 m)
 \$1 = sh (1984): 359.70 (1985): 672.02
 (1986/7): 1,400.00
 sh = Ugandan shillings
 Population: 15,766,000
 18-30 31-45
 Men: 1,595,000 1,084,000
 Women: 1,635,000 1,102,000

TOTAL ARMED FORCES:

Active: National Resistance Army (NRA):
 ?20,000; believed absorbing elms of other
 groups incl Federal Democratic Movement
 (FEDEMU), Ugandan Freedom Movement
 (UFM).
 Loosely org in bdes and bns, mostly
 equipped with small arms, some by machine
 guns; absorbing former Ugandan
 National Liberation Army (UNLA)
 equipment.
Terms of service: voluntary.

Equipment† incl:

Tks: 10 T-34/-54/-55, 3 M-4 (unserviceable).
 APC: 150: BTR-40/-152, OT-64C, *Saracen*
 (unserviceable).
 Arty: guns: 76mm: 60: 122mm: 20.
 ATK: ATGW: 40 AT-3 *Sagger*.
 AD: guns: 40: 23mm, 37mm. SAM: SA-7.
 Ac: 6 AS-202 *Bravo* trg.

OPPOSITION:

Uganda National Liberation Army (UNLA).
 Uganda National Army (UNA).
 Uganda Peoples Democratic Movement
 (UPDM): military wing
 Uganda Peoples Democratic Army (UPDA)
 claims Div HQ, 7 bdes, one of 5,000
 men.
 Uganda Freedom Movement (UFM).
 Uganda National Rescue Front (UNRF).
 status unclear, said to be seeking integration
 with NRA.

* Exchange rates for calendar year used to obtain
 dollar figures (153.86 for 1983 and 359.7 for
 1984).

† Recurrent expenditure only.

‡ Serviceability doubtful.

(5)

RWANDA

GDP 1984: fr 160.00 bn (\$1.60 bn)
 1985: fr 165.87 bn (\$1.64 bn)
 growth 1984: 5.5% 1985c: 1.7%
 Inflation 1985: 1.8% 1986c: 2.5%
 Debt 1984: \$250.0 m 1985: \$330.0 m
 Def bdt 1987: fr 3.00 bn (\$37.44 m)
 FMA* 1986: \$2.5 m
 \$1 = fr (1984): 100.17 (1985): 101.26
 (1986): 87.64 (1987): 80.12
 fr = Rwanda francs
 Population: 5,965,000
 18-30 31-45
 Men: 756,000 363,000
 Women: 750,000 421,000

TOTAL ARMED FORCES (all services form
part of the Army):

Active: 5,150.

Terms of service: voluntary.

ARMY: 5,000.

1 cdo bn.
 1 recce sqn.
 8 inf coys.
 1 engr coy.

Equipment:

AFV: *recce*: 12 AML-60. APC: 16 M-3.
 Mor: 81mm: 8.
 ATK: RL: 83mm *Blindicide*. guns: 57mm: 6.

(6) BURUNDI

GDP 1984: fr 119.20 bn (\$995.7 m)
 1985: fr 130.08 bn (\$1.08 bn)
 growth 1984: -1.5% 1985: 8.6%
 Inflation 1985: 3.7% 1986: -1.8%
 Debt 1984: \$350.0 m 1985: \$415.0 m
 Def exp 1985c: fr 4.20 bn (\$34.80 m)
 1986c: fr 4.78 bn (\$41.89 m)
 \$1 = fr (1984): 119.71 (1985): 120.69
 (1986): 114.17
 fr = Burundi francs

TOTAL ARMED FORCES (all services incl.)

Gendarmerie form part of the Army:

Active: 8,700.

Terms of service: voluntary.

People's Militia: 45,000 trained: 2 years part time: men and women 20-35 (military and civic duties).

ARMY: 7,000.

6 Military Regions.

5 inf 'regts': HQ, 3 'bns' (each 1 coy of 5 platoons).

1 AB 'regt': HQ, 1 hde, 2 coys.

1 tk 'bn': 2 platoons.

1 arty 'bn': 2 tps.

1 engr 'bn', 1 sigs 'bn'.

Honour Guard.

Garrison School.

Equipment:

AFV: ~~rece~~ 1983: 15 AML-60/-90, some 24 EE-9

Cascavel reported, 10 M-8, 4 M-20, 30 *Ferret*

APC: 13 M-3.

Arty: how: 105mm: M-101.

MRL: 107mm: Ch Type-63.

Mor: 60mm, 10 81mm.

ATK: RL: M-20 3.5-in. (89mm).

NCL: RPG-7, Ch Type-52 75mm.

AD: 30 14.5mm hy machine guns. SAM: SA-7.

AIR FORCE: 200:

some combat ac, no armed hel.

Ftr: 1 sqn with MiG-17.

Tpt: 15: 2 C-47 (DC-3), 2 Nord 262 *Frégate*.

2 HS-748A/B, 1 Aero Commander 500B.

1 MH-1521M *Broussard*.

Linison: 9 SF-260, 2 Cessna (1 F-172N,

1 F-337E *Super Skymaster*).

Hel: 4: 2 SA-316C *Alouette III*, 2 SA-365

Dauphin.

(On order: 4 SF-260 ac.)

PARA-MILITARY: 1,750:

Gendarmerie 1,500: 6 coys (2 mobile).

Security Company (CRG) 250.

(7)

TANZANIA

GDP 1984: sh 75.66 bn (\$4.23 bn)
growth 1984: 2.5%
Inflation 1985: 33.3%
Debt 1985: \$3.0 bn 1986: \$3.5 bn
Def bdgt 1984/5: sh 3.66 bn (\$204.64 m)
1985/6: sh 4.17 bn (\$223.42 m)
\$1 = sh (1984/5): 17.875 (1985/6): 18.646
sh = Tanzanian shilling

Population: 22,710,000
18-30 31-45
Men: 2,324,000 1,665,000
Women: 2,398,000 1,732,000

TOTAL ARMED FORCES:

Active: 40,050 (perhaps 20,000 conscripts).
Terms of service: national service incl civil
duties, 2 years.
Reserve: 10,000: armed elem of Citizen's
Militia.

ARMY: 38,350 (some 20,000 conscripts).

3 div HQ.
8 inf bdes.
1 tk bde.
2 fd arty bns, 2 AA arty bns (6 btys).
2 mor bns.
1 SAM bn with SA-3, SA-6.
2 ATK bns.
2 sigs bns.

Equipment:

Tks: 30 Ch Type-59.
It 30 Ch Type-62, 36 Scorpion.
AFV: reco: 20 BRDM-2. APC: 45 BTR-40/-152.
Arty: 340: guns: 76mm: 40 ZIS-3;
122mm: 200; 130mm: 50.
MRL: 122mm: 50 BM-21.
Mor: 350: 82mm: 120mm.
ATK: MCL: 75mm: 540 Ch Type-52.
AD: guns: 14.5mm: 280 ZPU-2/-4;
23mm: 40 ZU-23; 37mm: 120 Ch Type-55.
SAM: 9 SA-3, 12 SA-6, SA-7.

NAVY: 700.

Bases: Dar es Salaam, Zanzibar, Mwanza.
FAC: 6 Ch Shanghai-11.
Patrol craft: 10(: coastal: 7: 1 GDR Schwalbe, 2
GDR MB-13 50-ton; 4 Vosper Thornycroft,
75-ft in Zanzibar.
Lake: 3 Ch Yulin.
Amph(: 4 N. Korean Nampo mod LCA.
Spares are short; many vessels are not
operational.

AIR FORCE: 1,000:

29 combat ac, no armed hel.
Ftr: 3 sqns with 11 Ch J-7, 18 Shenyang (10
J-6, 8 J-4).
Tpt: 1 sqn with 4 BAe (1 HS-125-700,
3 HS-748), 5 DHC-5D Buffalo, 1 An-2.
Trg: 2 MiG-15UTI, 6 Cherokee, 9 Cessna
(7 310, 2 404), some Piaggio P-149D.
Hel: 2 CH-47C, 6 Agusta-Bell (4 AB-205,
2 AB-206).
(On order: An-26, An-32 tpt ac.)

Forces Abroad: Mozambique: 650.

PARA-MILITARY:

Police Field Force 1,400.
Police Marine Unit (100).
Citizen's Militia: 100,000.

(8) **ZAMBIA**

GDP 1984: K 4.93 bn (\$2.75 bn)
1985: K 6.33 bn (\$2.33 bn)
growth 1984: -1.3% 1985: 3.0%
Inflation 1985: 37.4% 1986: 69.9%
Debt 1985: \$3.0 bn 1986: \$4.0 bn
\$1 = K (1984): 1.7944 (1985): 2.7137
(1986): 7.3046

K = kwacha

Population: 7,134,000

18-30

31-45

Men: 717,000

437,000

Women: 757,000

508,000

TOTAL ARMED FORCES:

Active: 16,200.

Terms of service: voluntary.

ARMY: 15,000.

1 armd regt (incl 1 armd recce bn).

9 inf bns (3 Reserve).

3 arty btys. 2 AA arty btys.

1 engr bn. 2 sigs sqns.

Equipment:

Tks: 30: T-54/55. Ch Type-59. It: 30 PT-76.

AFV: recce: 65 BRDM-1/-2. APC: 13 BTR-60.

Arty: 153: guns: 76mm: 35: 130mm: 25.

how: 105mm: 18 pack: 122mm: 25 D-30.

MRL: 122mm: 50 BM-21.

ATK: RCL: 57mm: 12 M-18: 75mm: M-20:

84mm: Carl Gustav. ATGW: AT-3 Sagger.

AD: guns: 20mm: 50 M-55 triple: 37mm: 40

M-1939: 57mm: 55 S-60: 85mm: 16 KS-12.

SAM: SA-7.

AIR FORCE: 1,200:

43 combat ac, no armed hel.

FGA: 2 sqns:

1 with 12 Ch J-6;

1 with 13 MiG-21.

COIN/trg:

1 sqn with 18 MB-326GB.

Tpt: 2 sqns:

1 with 9 Do-28;

1 with 6 DHC-2 Beaver, 5 DHC-4 Caribou.

6 DHC-5D Buffalo;

1 VIP flt with 2 Yak-40, 1 HS-748.

Trg: incl 8 SF-260MZ, 20 Safari, 2 Ch BT-3,

10 Jastreb/Galeb (?operational).

Hel: 1 sqn with 3 AB-205A, 3 AB-206.

2 AB-212, 16 Bell 47G, 7 Mi-8.

SAM: 1 bn: 3 btys: SA-3 Goa.

PARA-MILITARY: 1,200.

Police Mobile Unit (PMU) 700; 1 bn of 4 coys.

Police Para-Military Unit (PPMU) 500; 1 bn of

3 coys.

(9) ANGOLA

GDP 1985: K 120.86 bn (\$4.04 bn)
 growth 1985: 0.0%
 Debt* 1985: \$2.7 bn 1986: \$3.2 bn
 Def bdt† 1985: K 29.43 bn (\$983.69 m)
 1986: K 32.73 bn (\$1.09 bn)
 \$1 = K (1985/6/7): 29.918
 K = kwanza
 Population: 8,435,000
 18-30 31-45
 Men: 937,000 687,000
 Women: 969,000 717,000

TOTAL ARMED FORCES:

Active: 53,000 (incl some 10,000 'Guerrilla Forces' (ODP militia), 24,000 conscripts).
Terms of service: conscription, 2 years.
 Reserves: Militia (ODP: see Para-Military, below): 50,000.

ARMY: 49,500 (perhaps 24,000 conscripts, 10,000 ODP).
 10 Military Regions, (some may be fd HQ).
 5 mot inf bdes (each of 1 tk, 2 inf bns, arty).
 19 inf bdes (2 ODP 'Guerrilla Force').
 4 AA arty bdes.
 10 tk bns.
 6 arty bns.

Equipment:

Tks: 540: 150 T-34, 300 T-54/-55, 90 T-62.
 It: some 50 PT-76.
 AFV: *recco*: 200 BRDM-2.
 APC: 255 BTR-40/-50/-60/-152.
 Arty: *guns/how*: 500: incl 76mm, 85mm, 100mm.
 SU-100 SP, 122mm, 130mm, 152mm.
 MRL: 122mm: 75 BM-21.
 Mör: 82mm: 460: 120mm: 40.
 ATK: RCL: 900: 75mm, 82mm, 107mm.
 ATGW: AT-3 *Sagger*.
 AD: *guns*: 300+: 14.5mm: ZPU-4; 20mm: M-55;
 23mm: M-1939, ZU-23-2, 20 ZSU-23-4 SP;
 37mm; 57mm: 70 S-60 towed, 40
 ZSU-57-2 SP.
 SAM: SA-7.

NAVY: § 1,500.

Bases: Luanda (HQ), Lobito, Namibe.
 FAC(G): 6 *Osa-II* with 4 SS-N-2 SSM.
 FAC(T): 5 Sov *Shershen* (?3 serviceable).
 Patrol craft, large: 4 *Port Argos*, coastal: 8:
 1 *Zhuk*, 2 *Poluchat*, 1 *Jupiter*, 4 *Bellatrix*.
 Amph: LCT: 3 *Polnocny B*, 1 *Alfange* (?unservice-
 able). LCM: 5 Sov T-4.
 Coastal Defence: SS-C-1 *Sepal*, radar.

AIR FORCE/AIR DEFENCE: 2,000:

some 148 combat ac, 21 armed hel. §
 FGA: 4 sqns with 30 MiG-23; 61 MiG-21MF; 8
 Su-22, incl 2 trg.
 Interceptor: 3 sqns:
 1 with 8 MiG-19, 2 with 30 MiG-21 bis.
 COIN/*recco*: 1 sqn with 8 PC-7.
 MR: 1 F-27MPA, 2 EMB-111 *Maritime*
 Bandeirante.
 Tpt: 2 sqns with 3 C-47 (Douglas DC-3), some
 11 CASA C-212 (?8 operational), 10 An-2, 12
 An-12 (Sov forces spt ac), 33 An-26, 4 PC-6
 Turbo-Porter, 8 BN 2 *Islander*.
 Hel: 2 sqns with 21 Mi-25 (?A), 13 Mi-17, 50
 Mi-8, 24 SA-316B *Alouette III*, 8 SA-365N
 Dauphin, 5 AS-341 *Gazelle*, some 6 IAR-316B.
 Trg: incl 1 MiG-15UTI, 6 Yak-11, 11 PC-7.
 AD: 5 SAM bns; 21 radar units.
 AAM: AA-2 *Atoll*.
 SAM: 10 btys: 12 SA-2 *Guideline*, 40 SA-3
 Goa, 72 SA-6 *Gainful*, 48 SA-8 *Gecko*, SA-9
 Gaskin, SA-13 *Gopher*.
 Radar: EW: *Tall King*, *Spoon Rest*.
 search: *Bar Lock*, *flat Face*, *Squat Eye*.
 height-finding: *Side Net*.
 msl comd: *Fan Song* (SA-2), *Low Blow* (SA-3),
 Straight flush (SA-6), *Land Roll* (SA-8);
 AA arty: *slap Wheel*, *fire Can*, *Gun Dish*.
 (On order (status uncertain): ac: An-26; hel: some
 30 IAR-316B attack, 2 SA-365 *Dauphin*.)

Forces Abroad: *São Tomé*: some 500; 1 bn.

PARA-MILITARY:

Militia (*People's Defence Organization*, (ODP)
50,000: 11+ 'bdes'; 10,000 serving with the
Regular Army at any one time.

Border Guard (TGFA): 7,000.

South West African People's Organization
(SWAPO): 8,900; 22,500 fighting UNITA.
?1,500 in Namibia.

'Popular Vigilance Brigades': unarmed civilians
support police in counter-intelligence and
security role.

FOREIGN TROOPS:

Cuba: 28,000 (plus 8,000 civilian
instructors/advisers); 5 'Div Comds', some 13
inf regts in security and in field roles, combat
ac pilots, technicians, advisers.

E. Germany: 500; intelligence and security advisers.

N. Korea: 4,000 reported.

Portugal; other: ?100 incl combat pilots,
technicians (contract personnel).

USSR: 950 advisers and technicians; ship
repair facilities Luanda; *Bear D MR ac*.

Zaire: ex-Katangan Gendarmerie (FLNC) reported.
African National Congress (ANC): perhaps 1,000.

OPPOSITION:

UNITA (*Union for the Total Independence of
Angola*): some 26,000 'regulars' (1-2 years
service), 34,000 'militia' (spt and log);

Eqpt: captured T-34/85, T-55 MBT, misc APC
(not in service); BM-21 122mm MRL;
75mm, 76mm, 122mm fd guns; 81mm,
82mm, 120mm mor; 85mm RPG-7 RL;
75mm RCL; 12.7mm by machine guns;
14.5mm, 20mm and ZU-23-2 23mm AA
guns; *Stinger*, SAM-7; lt ac reported
(probably inactive).

FNLA (*National Front for the Liberation of
Angola*): (Bakongo tribesmen) claims up to
5,000, actual strength \approx 250; small arms only.

FLEC (*Front for the Liberation of the Cabinda
Enclave*): (200-300); small arms only.

* Incl some \$1.5 bn owed to the Soviet Union,
mostly for armaments.

† Angola is reported to have received up to \$2 bn in
Soviet military material between 1983 and 1986.

‡ Delivery and loss data incomplete: eqpt totals
uncertain.

§ Serviceability, especially of non-Soviet eqpt,
uncertain.



ZAIRE

GDP 1984: Z 99.58 bn (\$2.76 bn)
 1985: Z 143.50 bn (\$2.88 bn)
 growth 1984: 2.7% 1985: 2.0%
 Inflation 1985: 41.4% 1986: 42.1%
 Debt 1985: \$4.7 bn 1986: \$5.0 bn
 Def hdgt* 1987: Z 5.00 bn (\$45.28 m)
 FMA† 1985: \$7.0 m 1986: \$6.7 m
 \$1 = Z (1984): 36.129 (1985): 49.873
 (1986): 59.625 (1987): 110.424

Z = zaires

Population: 34,635,000‡

18-30

31-45

Men: 3,576,000 2,512,000

Women: 3,718,000 2,688,000

TOTAL ARMED FORCES:

Active: 51,000 (incl Gendarmerie).

Terms of service: voluntary.

ARMY: 22,000.

3 Military Regions.

1 inf div (3 inf bdes).

1 Special Forces div:

1 para bde (3 para, 1 spt bns) (2nd to form).

1 special force (cdo/COIN) bde.

1 Presidential Guard bde.

1 indep armd bde.

2 indep inf bdes (each 3 inf bns, 1 spt bn).

Equipment:

Tks: some 50 Ch Type-62.

AFV: *reco*: 95 AML-60, 60 -90.

APC: 12 M-113, 12 K-63, 60 M-3.

Arty: 128: *guns/how*: 75mm: 30 pack;

85mm: 20 Type 56;

122mm: 20 M-1938/D-30, 30 Type 60;

130mm: 8 Type 59.

MRL: 107mm: 20 Type 63.

Mor: 81mm; 4.2-in. (107mm); 120mm: 50.

ATK: *ACL*: 57mm; 75mm; 106mm; 107mm.

AD: *guns*: 12.7mm; 14.5mm; 20mm; 37mm;

M-1939; 40mm.

NAVY: 1,500 incl marines.

Bases: Banana, Boma, Matadi (coast), Kinshasa (river), Kalémié (lake).

FAC: 5 Ch *Shanghai* II.

Patrol craft: 38 (: 3 N. Korean P-4/ (no torpedo tubes, ?operational); 6 Swiftships 51-ft, 29 Arcoa 25-ft.

MARINES: (600).

AIR FORCE: 2,500:

20 combat ac, no armed hel.

Ftr: 1 sqn with 8 *Mirage* 5M/5DM.

COIN: 2 sqns with 6 MB-326K, 6 AT-6G

Tpt: 1 wing with 5 C-130H *Hercules*.

6 C-54/DC-6, 8 C-47, 2 C-46, 1 BN-2

Islander, 2 MU-2J (VIP), *Falcon*-20.

Hel: 1 sqn with 7 SA-319B *Alouette* III, 9

SA-330 *Puma*, 1 AS-332L *Super Puma*, 1

SA-321 *Super Frelon* (VIP).

Trg: incl 21 Cessna (9 310, 12 150), 8

MB-326GB, 9 SF-260MC ac, 6 Bell

47 hel.

(On order: S-211 COIN/trg, 4 F-27-500 tpt ac.)

PARA-MILITARY:

Gendarmerie 25,000 (to be 27,000); 40 bns.

Civil Guard 25,000.

* Excl capital expenditure.

† In 1987 China granted a credit of yuan 7 m

(\$1.88 m) to strengthen military co-operation.

‡ Estimates based on reported results of 1985 census. 3

The cited charts demonstrate clearly that the armed forces of the neighboring countries are highly equipped with more sophisticated and long range weapons than the Zaire armed forces.

In the light of this comparison, there is no doubt that if only Angola attacks Zaire using all the sophisticated and modern weapons that it had received from the Soviet Union and other sources, it will be very difficult for the Zairian armed forces to contain the hostilities. Angola can also be resupplied easily by its allies at its large sea coast, and it can also in case of conflict plan to block our narrow 40 km sea coast. In addition since Zaire does not have any military or defense alliance treaties or agreements with any of its neighbors, it is likely that in case of a conflict several of its neighboring countries (particularly the Congo, Zambia and Tanzania) will join together with Angola and create several fronts that will force Zaire to scatter its combat units and lose the bulk of the forces required to counter the strongest enemy. I may identify these countries neighboring Zaire as the red belt which is strangling Zaire. As the military balance of 1986-1987 pointed out that in Central Africa, the Soviet Union has friendship treaties and cooperation with Angola and the Popular Republic of the Congo, and also gives military assistance to Zambia, Uganda, Tanzania and Burundi. Cuba backed by the Soviet Union and its other allies and has around 40,000 military personnel in Angola. The Cuban military personnel assist the Angolan government in fighting UNITA Insurrection but also train dissidents armed groups from Zaire. My analysis can be supported by Regional Focus of June 10, 1986 which mentioned:

Other Soviet targets are ripe in Africa, for regimes viewed as neocolonialist are fair game for national liberation movements. The most likely candidate for such an eventuality is Zaire, where the Mobutu regime wavers precariously. The FLNC and other groups inside and outside Zaire are organizing to topple the regime. Across

the borders waits the old Katanga gendarmerie, trained and armed by Moscow, Havana and Berlin. It could launch a third invasion into Zaire's southern province of Shaba anytime.⁴

To my best understanding, it is certain that the FLNC (National Liberation Front of the Congo) elements are currently helping the Angolan government in fighting UNITA. While Zaire has good military relationships with its friendly countries as Belgium, France, Israel, China, West Germany and the United States, it is not provided with the same quantities and qualities of military weapons and equipment that the Eastern bloc gives to Angola, the Congo, Tanzania, Zambia and others. Zaire also does not have a large number of foreign military personnel on its soil such as its neighboring countries do. In relation to the fighting that is going on in Angola: "The Angolan government forces have been directed by a high-ranking Soviet general and backed by more than 40,000 Cuban troops."⁵ If the Angolan government and its allies of the communist bloc are preoccupied at the present time with the war in Angola, the question remains how will USSR orient the Cuban troops and other eastern forces once the war in Angola comes to an end. It is likely that the Soviets will avoid being engaged in combat against the South African military forces in Namibia nor even deeply in South Africa itself, because South Africa has highly sophisticated, well-equipped and organized armed forces; and it remains a vital ally of the Western powers, as a source of important minerals for the Western powers, and as an anti-communist fighter in Southern Africa and it controls the strategic location of the Cape of Good Hope watching over the Atlantic and Indian Oceans SLOC (Sea Lines of Communication). The Western powers will not delay to help South Africa militarily. My perception conveys that the Soviet Union will likely seek a weak state, neighbor to Angola where it can further project its military

power. This weak state could only be the Republic of Zaire in the Soviet's mind. My judgment can be supported by the following statement made in the Intelligence Digest of September 15, 1987:

The authorities in the West African country of Zaire announced on July 31, 1987 that three Soviet diplomats in Kinshasa had been expelled for spying. We understand they had been gathering information, with the help of a network of local people, about a covert operation by which the U.S. is sending arms supplies to the anti-government movement of UNITA in neighbouring Angola. The arms are passing through Zaire. Heavy American or American-chartered transport aircraft land at the rate of three a week at the now renovated old Belgian base of Kamina. The cargo is then loaded on to lighter aircraft operated by the pilots of South African Defence Force for the final leg to UNITA's headquarters in Jamba, in the extreme Southeast of Angola.

The Russians have been using evidence of Zaire's involvement with the U.S. and South Africa to embarrass pro-Western President Mobutu Sese Seko who has been denying this cooperation. However, shipment of arms to Dr. Jonas Savimbi's UNITA in Angola, including Stinger rocket launchers, have proved very effective, enabling the rebel movement to start gaining the upper hand in the civil war there.⁶

From the lessons learned when the rebels based in Angola struck deep into Zaire in 1977 and 1978, we must understand that the Russians and the Angolan pro-Marxist government did organize the two invasions as reprisal measures against Zaire that had sided with the FNLA, FLEC and UNITA all pro-Western Angolan movements during the Independence War of Angola in 1975. In relation to the current situation in Angola, there is great probability that the Eastern powers with its African allies might consider another reprisal action against those African states that are helping UNITA. In this case the Republic of Zaire which is weak militarily and having several dissidents or opposition groups in foreign countries has the risks to be pointed as the first target. We must also remember that in 1960 to 1965, the Soviet Union was the main supporter of the insurrectional movement in Zaire. If the United

Nations did intervene to reestablish the unity of Zaire that was dismantled by secessions, and other tribal and ideological conflicts, the situation will be very different today or in the future. The Zairian security remains then the highest priority for the Zairian people. But, how can the security of a large country like Zaire with 905,381 sq. miles (2,344,932 sq. km.) and very permeable borders of 10,120 km with its neighboring countries be maintained? This question should bring us to look briefly at our armed forces history. The list hereunder includes those conflicts that our armed forces had fought in order to maintain our sovereignty and the national integrity of our territory:

- o The secessions of Katanga and South Kasai 1960-1963;
- o The campaign to eliminate the communist backed rebellion in 1963-1965;
- o The mutiny of mercenaries and the Katangese gendarmeries from July to November 1967;
- o The support of FNLA in Angola from August to December 1975;
- o The 80 Day War against FLNC invaders in SHABA from March to June 1977 (SHABAI);
- o The brief 6 Day war against FNLC fighters who seized Kolwezi in June 1978 (SHABAI);
- o The repelling of rebels in the town of MOBA in November 1984 and again in June 1985.

Among all these episodes, much consideration must be given to two invasions of SHABA. Following the first invasion of the region of SHABA in 1977, Marshal Mobutu Sese Seko, President of the Republic of Zaire declared: "The Zairian Armed Forces had suffered a moral defeat because of the discouragement of the soldiers, caused in turn by the negligence of certain of their leaders, irresponsible and greedy, not always devoted to the national cause,"⁷ but

before that in 1974 the President had expressed dismay over the persistent shortcomings of the army, by enumerating the "Ten Scourges" revaging Zairian society, he identified the seventh as a "costly and unproductive army."⁸ Here, President Mobutu Sese Seko was very disappointed with the leadership that really lacked during the events of SHABA I and SHABA II. The Zairian armed forces that had a good performance during the war against the mercenaries in 1967, had some weaknesses in combat against the invaders in the SHABA region in 1977 and 1978. The President also added:

The Zairian Army is a strong army capable to accomplish its mission. The moral defeat of the army concerns all of us. This is why I have taken myself the command of the operations. I have just accomplished my task as a soldier and the guarantor of the integrity of our country. My presence has precipitated the course of events. From the moral defeat, and, in spite of numerous sacrifices, the army had passed into enthusiasm and to great military victories.⁹

To my judgment, the slow understanding of our military leaders during the two wars in SHABA was certainly a legacy of the colonial era. First, when the Belgians did create the Colonial army, in the Force Publique in 1908 when King Leopold owned the Congo as his private property transferred the country to the Belgian government, the soldiers were indoctrinated with the ethos that the Force Publique constituted a distinct social category from the rest of the population, its members were servants of the colonial state. The exclusively European officer corps maintained a ruthless discipline over the population. Second, the Force Publique had faced a difficult adaptation to the new context of independence. But the worst of circumstances prevailed immediately within a week of the realization of Zairian sovereignty, the entire army dissolved in mutiny. And, during much of the First Republic era the security forces were broken into several fragments serving secessionist movements or individual groups. Differently as in the French and British colonies where Africans were

trained to become leaders, the new Zairian officers--for the most part former non-commissioned officers without leadership and management experiences came from non-commissioned officers ranks. Despite this lack of experience, our military leaders who took over the army had worked hard to bring back the unity of our country that was completely dismembered by several conflicts from July 4, 1960, just four days after gaining our independence until 1965. The problems of leadership in the Zairian armed forces led us to realize whether Zaire being an extremely large country, with an extensive land borders to protect had a well-trained armed forces with effective leadership and the capacity to respond quickly and efficiently to any external aggression without having to call for outside assistance such as Belgium and France, or some African states. Currently, there are no threats emanating from Central Africa, but the following signs must be considered for the future:

- o In June 1986, Congolese soldiers exchanged fire with a Zairian patrol boat on the Zaire River.

- o In the northeastern section, opposition groups fighting against the government of Sudan always withdraw deep into Zaire's borders when avoiding the Sudanese army.

- o Units of Ugandan rebels' army continue semi-guerrilla war against the central government of Uganda near the border of Zaire.

- o Tanzania and Burundi served as sanctuary to the outlaw bands persisting in the high mountains in the northern part of the city of Kalemie along Lake Tanganyika

- o There have been some border problems between Zambia and Zaire.

- o The mineral rich region of SHABA and the ongoing major struggle between UNITA forces and Angolan government backed by eastern power, will remain the main concern for the security of Zaire.

o Possible terrorist infiltration to sabotage key areas such as airports, mining industries, seaports, hydroelectric dams, etc.

o The social and economic burdens on the population can also create some internal difficulties.

In the following chapter I will develop some thought that must be given particular attention in order to improve the skill and operational level of the Zairian armed forces.

ENDNOTES

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8. Mobutu, "Discours du President de la Republique du Zaire devant le Conseil Legislatif, le 4 Jannier 1975," mimeographed, pp. 13-14, Elima, 31 December 1974.

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CHAPTER V

POSSIBLE SUSTAINABLE PLAN FOR A STRONG AND LASTING SECURITY OF ZAIRE

Zaire having several borders with those countries which are supplied by the Eastern powers, we should be aware of the threats enumerated earlier in this paper and address our national policies that reflect our country's national interests in self-preservation, independence, integrity, security and socioeconomic well being of all our population. The proper use of our national elements of power which are abundant, especially in natural resources, minerals and agriculture products, the large numbers of our population, and our armed forces can surely create and maintain the entire population with the national will to work or to fight harder in order to keep peace, or to win during the hostilities. The Republic of Zaire must therefore strive harder to become self-sufficient and able to deter any external or internal aggressions. To achieve this objective we must:

- o Possess the survivability, be able to survive when any attack is launched from neighboring countries, and to retaliate with all the means for inflicting heavy losses on the aggressors who should not try to attack our country again.
- o Possess credibility. The neighbors must know that Zaire has strong forces with good discipline and appropriate materials, and can respond quickly and strongly in case of an aggression.
- o Respect the right and the existence of each state with its borders as recognized by the OAU and the U.N. Charters.
- o Pursue in overall a continuous economic-social development of our country and the training of our armed forces which remain the ultimate for an adequate security of our nation.

o Plan and program the development of our defense industries, so in the future we can rely less on foreign assistance.

In terms of formulating the national policy of our nation, we must always recall what Carl von Clausewitz expressed in his writing: "War is the continuation of policy by other means."¹ This short sentence about war clearly tells us that war is not a mere act of policy but it is a true political instrument, otherwise it is the continuation of political activity by other means. In order to achieve the objective by using this particular instrument, Clausewitz said "If you want to overcome your enemy you must match your effort against his power of resistance, which can be expressed as the product of the two inseparable factors, viz: (1) the total means at his disposal and (2) the strength of his will."² When relating this thought to the case of Zaire, the Zairian people must be prepared to fight war in several fronts first of all to counter the external threats from the Red Belt and secondly to deter any internal uprising that might derive from social and economic difficulties, but also from subversions. Consequently, the challenges that Zaire might face in the future will be overcome only if the Zairian armed forces has the ability, the will and the readiness capability to deter the external and internal aggressions. Therefore, it is necessary to understand above all that wars are fought and won by men, and not by machines. The human dimension and leadership remain then very essential in all combat. If the combat record of Zairian armed forces was never brilliant in the past, it is our duty to review our military history, in order to determine the causes of failure in the past armed conflicts so we can correct them and take better measure for the future. While some criticisms about the Zairian armed forces do not reflect the realities of the situation, we must not reject completely foreign analysis about our defense system:

In the post-independence years, political disturbances in all but one the nine countries bordering on Zaire have spilled over the frontiers, at momentarily. At one time or another since 1960, supplies or sanctuary for Zairian insurgents have been provided by or through all neighboring states except Central African Republic and Rwanda. The mediocre and deteriorating communications infrastructure makes movement of forces difficult; the vast dimensions of Zaire add to the intrinsic logistic difficulties. Logistics in turn are an enduring weakness of the Zairian security. No formula has yet been discovered to make the FAZ (Zairian Armed Forces) a reliable and proficient force for the actual defense of the country, even though adverse training programs have imparted skills to large numbers of individual officers and soldiers.³

This passage of Mr. Crawford Young and Thomas Turner tells us that while Zaire has several economic and social difficulties, within our armed forces, the following elements of military capabilities must be looked at in order to determine their levels:

- o Human resources;
- o Logistics;
- o Mobility;
- o Firepower;
- o and Manpower.

These are the most important elements that must be considered when there is a chance to propose a possible sustainable plan for a strong and lasting security of the Republic of Zaire. Also Clausewitz gave us in his studies on war the qualities of leaders that should command the army when he said:

War is the realm of uncertainty, three quarters of the factors on which action in war is based are wrapped in a fog of greater or lesser uncertainty. A sensitive and discriminating judgement is called for, a skilled intelligence to scent out the truth.⁴

This passage of Clausewitz thinking on war shows clearly that in order to command a battle leaders must be trained and become qualified to apprehend the

frictions with their difficult situations in war. If several Zairian analysts conclude today that the weakness of leadership has been the root of bad performance of the Zairian armed forces in almost all the combat situations. In the past, the great mistakes came from the Belgians who colonized the Zairian people to whom they did not provide the high knowledge of management and command. We can remember: "On Independence Day there were fewer than ten native Warrant Officers. Qualified Congolese were first admitted to the Royal Military School in Belgium for officer training in 1957, but none had been graduated by mid-1960."⁵ It was therefore impossible for the Zairian soldiers to be led successfully in some armed conflicts that occurred in the Republic of Zaire from 1960 by those leaders who lacked adequate training and experiences.

Although it has been demonstrated lately that with the training gained from foreign military schools abroad, and from foreign military advisors in our country, the leadership had considerably improved in the Zairian armed forces. The Zairian armed forces had performed respectably in a credible manner when it was dispatched to Chad in 1981-1982 and also in 1983 as a peacekeeping force of the Organization of African Unity (OAU). When the rebels made a small scale incursion from Tanzania on the town of Moba in the East of Zaire on November 13, 1984 and on June 17, 1985, the Zairian armed forces successfully repelled the attacks without appealing for outside assistance. These two events show that Zairian armed forces possess at the present well-trained officers, and that its performance can be further improved in the future if some strong decisions are made to sustain the Zairian security. We should recognize that since 1960, the Zairian armed forces have never been engaged in a conventional war, because all the conflicts were of low intensity levels. There is then a important question

that must be addressed: What and how would the Zairian armed forces perform if ever the Angolan or Congolese forces with their highly sophisticated Soviet weapons and other military materials attack our country today or in the future?

It is for the best interests of the Zairian people that all the necessary measures that will provide maximum security to our country to be further studied and adopted. Success in this effort is victory in its truest and possibly only real meaning. On the other hand, the elemental purposes of survival is involved directly and immediately when open hostilities begin. War then takes on a total nature, compelling of practically all the populations efforts for stopping the aggressors. We must therefore examine and determine the levels of those elements which are key ingredients to our military capability:

- o Human Resources (Skills, Leadership, Morale): We must understand that military forces are complex organizations that require specialists as well as leaders capable of maintaining coordination and motivation.

- oo Obtaining adequate numbers of specialists from riflemen to sophisticated weapon users and repairmen entails not only elaborate training but command and organizational procedures that will deploy and use skills effectively and that will maintain and refurbish them over a period of time.

- oo Whatever the overall of skills and training within our armed forces there is much need for the integrity of leadership which will deploy effectively all the resources put at his disposition.

- oo We must keep in mind that the overall effectiveness of a military force depends upon the development of human resources by providing adequate training. Since weaponry or equipment without manpower capable of operating,

maintaining, and repairing it will become worthless and more of a burden than a benefit.

o Logistics (Supply and Maintenance): Combat simply cannot be sustained without a well-developed logistics system. Feeding, clothing, housing, paying, and nursing large numbers of people as well as supplying, fueling, repairing, calibrating, and replacing old equipment is complex for us in the Zairian armed forces. Also the poor communication infrastructure and the difficult terrain and climate conditions also create a lot of difficulties in moving and supporting our troops and material in the field. We must improve our communication system with an absolute priority.

o Mobility: Very much related to logistics, the ability to quickly move troops, equipment, and supplies on a large distance as in Zaire requires physical, financial, and human resources. In the past we have depended several times on foreign assistance for the airlift of our troops and equipment. The civilian and military aircraft and vehicles also have been used. It is vital to consider that mobility in combat is the soul for delivering troops to any location. In Zaire, we will be able to counter the threat at the borders quickly only if we master the mobility problem.

o Fire Power: We must realize that since we do not manufacture our own weapons or other military equipment, the outside suppliers when delivering equipment to us requires money, political allegiance, or military access. Explicitly or implicitly, a military supply relationship with foreign countries always carries with it political obligations. Dependence upon the suppliers for a continuing flow of ammunition and spare parts as well as for technical and training assistance should be considered with caution. But the best alternative will necessitate that in Zaire we start thinking about developing our own defense industries.

o Manpower: Even if the perceived external or internal threat to Zaire is greater or lesser, expansion of manpower is economically expensive. It will be necessary to limit the size of the strength of the armed forces, and to put more emphasis on the training of the units. A small army with a good discipline and equipped with sophisticated weapons under a strong leadership can maintain successfully the security of the Republic of Zaire. Fewer soldiers of good quality are more important than a large army of lesser quality soldiers. In the early days of our independence, the Zairian armed forces was the only institution of our country that remained fully committed to the unity of Zaire. Today, it is still the backbone of our country's unity and security. It is important then to vision the future of Zairian armed forces in conjunction with our nation-building plan. While acquiring a suitable and economical defense system, the Zairian armed forces should be oriented toward the overall economic development process of the Republic of Zaire. The participation of our armed forces to develop our lines of communication (roads and airfields construction and maintenance, rivers and lakes maintenance), to provide medical care in rural areas to our population, to participate in agricultural development, will ensure our defense forces provide a high level of security to our country, but will also increase more rapidly our economic and social development. To accomplish this task, we especially need all the young Zairian men and women with some years of high school and college education, and we also must ensure our partners (foreign countries) of the capability to maintain our national security and mutual trust. But, in order for our armed forces to develop some means to increase our national defense capability. These mean not other things, but the creation of our national defense industries. As the experience has shown that in several developing countries the defense industrialization has been a part

of whole nation-building leading to self-sufficiency. In Zaire we must understand why these developing states are now throwing massive state resources into the development of their national defense industries. The Defense and Foreign Affairs Journal of December 1987 stressed that: "The success of countries such as Singapore, Brazil, South Africa and Egypt in regard of defense industries provides a clear incentive for action. They have shown what can be done."⁶ The development of our national defense industries must remain then as one of our primary objectives. In order to determine how we will develop such resources, and how well we will achieve this objective we need to ask ourselves a very basic question: Why industrialize in the defense sector? In reference to the situation of Zaire, I will answer this question by making the following considerations:

- o Operational Readiness: Our national defense industry must be designed to help ensure the highest possible operational readiness levels of the armed forces of Zaire.

- o Requirements: Our national defense industry should produce defense equipment specific to counter the external and internal threats and to meet our other military needs.

- o Foreign exchange earnings: The export of our national defense technology will help our country to earn foreign exchange.

- o Foreign exchange savings: Our national currency will become more stable and enable us to import foreign military equipment that we can not produce as well as other materials needed in our country.

- o Domestic employment: The defense industrialization will create and increase the economic benefit to the Zairian community as a whole.

o Technological spin-off: The defense industrialization will help the civil industrial sector to gain more technologies and to increase their production capacity.

o Increase in our national pride: The entire population of Zaire will be more ensured of a strong external and internal security of our nation and will be proud because we produce our own defense equipment for maintaining our security and defense.

o Adaptation of imported systems: Since it is very often difficult to adapt the imported materials to our needs and our geographic conditions, our national production will be adjusted to our situations and needs.

o Upgrading instead of buying abroad: Our national industries will provide the services for the life extension of our national military equipment, will make the necessary modifications on our old defense systems and produce sufficient spare parts at reasonable prices, rather than relying on buying totally new foreign materials and follow up spare parts at very high cost.

o Utilization of Zairian Civil Sector Industries' capacity: Our national defense industries will rely heavily on Civilian Sector Industries capacity for the production of certain critical items.

o Co-production with other states: In order to succeed in the creation of our defense industries we need a strong base investment, technologies and technicians from friendly industrialized nations: United States, France, Belgium, Great Britain, Canada, West Germany, Japan, Israel, Egypt, Brazil. But, we must also seek to get our neighboring countries and other African states to cooperate with us in the defense industrial sectors in order to ensure mutual understanding of our goals, and to maintain a stable security

climate for each state by pursuing a better regional social-economic development.

- o Communication and Agriculture: The defense industrialization of our country will incite a faster development and improvement of our communication networks, and agriculture, productions that can become the most important export commodities for earning foreign exchanges.

There are so many other considerations that can be added to the above list. However, it will be necessary that we make some studies to establish our national priorities for the foreseeable creation of our defense industrial framework. In this case some of the priorities should address the following critical problems:

- o Identification of threats.
- o Determination of our national objectives.
- o Determination of the shape of our national force structure.
- o Specification of equipment needed to fulfill the task.
- o Specification of our defense doctrine.

Our intelligence and planning process should include also the identification of all relevant capabilities: the location of workshops, facilities, companies and their skills, and the most important is the inventory of the educational facilities which are vital to the research and development of the equipment, and for the training of the personnel. It will also be required that our civil and military maintenance/repair facilities be spread around the entire country, to ensure maximum force flexibility. Other priorities that need to be considered are as follow:

- o Focusing on future expansion of equipment components or ordnance and ammunition. This is the first step toward true flexibility and independence,

by maintaining the ability to make the defense decision unhampered by pressure which could be brought by supplier states.

- o We must ensure during the planning phase that our national defense industry will have the capacity to adapt equipment: to modernize it, to extend its service life, etc. But particularly to be able to change the mission configuration as threats change, thereby enabling older and perhaps formerly unsuitable systems to meet a new need.

- o Prospecting of import substitution as a foreign exchange saving device, by producing items which will be found more cheaply abroad.

- o Come out with good quality production of defense equipment for export to help the national export picture. This includes the acquisition of technological skills and process from foreign countries (technology transfer), and also international defense co-production programs which can have a technology transfer aspect as well as political objectives.

- o We must also develop the process that will address such critical issues as the establishment of standards of quality assurance and system tolerance, similar to the U.S. Milspecs or NATO standards. Indeed, there should be an attempt to make standards internationally comprehensible and acceptable, particularly in order to make offshore procurement manageable. These lists of objectives and priorities are fundamental, and perhaps even incomplete. Nevertheless, it is worth stressing that even an industrialized state needs a cohesive identification of its national defense industrial mobilization capability. There must then be a truly detailed intelligence and planning program to identify all the assets and weaknesses in order to come out with meaningful plans and programs.

When we are in the progress of our plan we must also keep in our mind that considerable obstacles stand on the path of planning a national defense

industrial capability. Education is perhaps the first challenge. All the institutions of trade and advanced learning must be identified within our country during our planning process. Also human resources are the most critical in developing an industrial capability. Good human talent can compensate for inferior equipment and resources; poor human talent cannot be compensated for by superior equipment and resources. The creation of "Centers of Excellence" must be for us then one of the top priorities. These centers are institutions of learning and research, and must also possess industrial capacity at which our country can excel.

I already have emphasized several times that the Republic of Zaire still faces a big threat from the Soviet-Cuban and other Eastern bloc military build-ups, particularly in Angola, but also from their foothold in the Congo, Tanzania and Zambia. Consequently, Zaire remains a very vulnerable state in Central Africa through its borders with nine different countries.

In the future our country may not receive the necessary military assistance as in the past, therefore we will have to rely on our own national defense production to sustain our armed forces. These are the major motivating factors that should drive us to acquire the technology and expertise that will lead us to develop our national defense industries. If by the 1990's or 2000's, the Republic can become self-sufficient for certain military equipment such as in the fields of:

- o Developing new vehicles or make modification to the existing vehicles to make them more suitable for our terrain and climate;
- o Creating simple but adequate ammunition for our weapons factories;
- o Manufacturing small weapons for our ground force use;
- o Becoming able to sustain our forces with our own military manufactured equipment;

At that time we will achieve real objectives for deterring our external and internal aggressors. Also the economic and social requirements will be met much better and more rapidly because our civil and defense industries will draw many of our population to work. And of course our communication networks will be improved, and in conjunction there will be a growth in our agriculture production. It will be also possible to attract more foreign investments that will bring a real rebounding to social-economic development. My sole concern is that the security of our country, the Republic of Zaire, must stay wholly in our hands, while we can expect also friendly assistance in case of hostilities. Therefore, only by creating our national defense industries will we become able to maintain a safer land for our future generations.

ENDNOTES

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CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSIONS


As I have pointed out at the beginning of my analysis, the situations of the Republic of Zaire cannot be abstracted from the context of African problems. If Zaire was between 1960 and 1965, then again in 1977 and 1978, the theater of armed conflict, at the present Soviet-Cuban troops and their other allies build-up in Angola and Congo also in lesser numbers in Zambia, Tanzania and Uganda, our country still faces a big threat from outside. For the Soviet Union and its allies, Zaire continues then to be the soft underbelly in Central Africa. If the United States had supported Zaire several times when a struggle broke out, also if some Western European nations, and African nations had come to Zaire's rescue, the Zairian people must realize that each nation pursues its own national interest objectives. To the Western blocs, Zaire is important in strategic terms because of its vast mineral wealth, its location, its support during several years of Western policies, and since 1980 because of its contribution to African peacekeeping efforts. Receiving assistance on several occasions should not remain in the Zairian people's minds as the only means of safeguarding the security of our country. Each nation has its own crucial problems to solve for its security and population, and will not always bring all the necessary materials or troops we need for helping in maintaining our security. Hiring of mercenaries for our national security problems is no more than pointing a knife with double edges to our own throat. It is important therefore for us, the Zairian people, to examine the elements, or those instruments that determine the strength of a nation in order for us to establish a sustainable lasting security plan for Zaire. These elements are:

- o The geographical data;

- o The materiel data;
- o The human resources;
- o and the organizational capabilities, which constitute the sum total of the internal or domestic sources of strength available to a state for maintaining its security.

In the figure below we can determine whether Zaire possesses these elements of power or if they are inexistent.

Fig. 1. Elements for Strength of a State



In relating the below data to the figures above, its very plausible that we in Zaire possess all the necessary elements of strength that can permit us to build a stronger defense system:

- o Geographic conditions: Located in Central Africa, Zaire has an area of 2,344,932 sq. km. (905,381 sq. mi.). Its terrain varies from tropical rain forest to mountainous terraces, plateaux, savannas, dense grasslands, and mountains. It has an equatorial climate: hot and humid in much of the north and west, cooler and drier in the south central area and the east. The

average rainfall for the entire country is about 107 centimeter (42 in.). It has an outlet of 40 km (10.5 miles) to the Atlantic Ocean. The geographic conditions can provide us all the necessary features to strengthen our security.

- o Material Conditions:

- oo Zaire produces and exports important quantities of strategic minerals (cobalt, diamond, manganese, zinc, copper, etc.).

- oo With 70 percent of the rural population cultivating, agriculture is the base of Zaire's economy.

- oo Industry is concentrated in the cities of Kinshasa and Lubumbashi. Production in food processing is emphasized, with clothes, metal and plastic manufacture coming in second.

- oo Zaire's hydroelectric power production exceeds 100,000 megawatts (mw), about 13 percent of the world's total. This huge quantity of power can be used to supply other Central African nations.

- oo Greater emphasis is put on private enterprise and market forces for economic development of Zaire.

- o Human Resources:

- oo Population: 35,500,000 (1987), it is predicted that by the year 2000 Zaire's population will reach 75,000,000.

- o Organizational Capabilities:

- oo A republic which is well organized politically and administratively.

- oo Military strength: 60,000 including the gendarmerie that plays the role of the National Police.

- o International organization: Zaire is a member of the U.N., Organization of African Unity (OAU) and affiliated to Intergovernmental

Council of Copper Exporting Countries (CIPEC), African Development Bank (AFDB), International Coffee Organization (ICO), International Tin Council (ITC), Great Lakes States Economic Community (CEPGL), INTELSAT, Non-Aligned Movement, Group of 77. And it receives military assistance from: Belgium, France, United States, West Germany, Israel and Peoples Republic of China. The location of Zaire makes it very vulnerable to any threats coming from neighboring countries. The communication network is also very degraded by lack of maintenance for the mobility of our units, Zaire possesses all the necessary instruments of power available to develop a better economy that will allow us to strengthen our defense system. I will stress that the proper use of these elements will make Zaire to become a stronger nation in Central Africa. I strongly have faith that the following courses of action can lead us to a better position:

- o A good management in every field in the country.
- o Development of agriculture.
- o Development and maintenance of communication network.
- o Acquisition of materiel that will give high mobility to the Zairian armed forces.
- o Reinforcement of leadership training for Zairian officers.
- o The appropriate welfare system to support our military personnel's moral.

It is very important that all our resources should be mobilized to sustain the Zairian armed forces during its training, for its welfare, and during the hostilities. Since we are in good standing with highly experienced and developed nations such as the United States, France, Belgium and West Germany, we should show our real national willingness to totally develop our country so they cannot only give a meaningful scale assistance to our country, but make

large investments to create important industry of various types including the production of the defense materiels. To avoid bloodshed, Zaire which already has economic agreements with some of its neighboring countries (Rwanda, Burundi, and the Central Africa Republic) should find some way to sign military and defense agreements with some of its neighbors who are adherents of peace, because the geographic conditions of most of the countries in Central Africa have much similitudes with those of Zaire and all our problems are almost identical. In conclusion, I may say that the performance of the Zairian armed forces can be straightened if we follow the theory and practice of preparing our country and armed forces for war into deterring internal and external aggressions. Once again we must always remember that Clausewitz said:

War is an Instrument of Policy. It must necessarily bear the character of policy and measure by its standards. The conduct of war, in its great outlines, is therefore policy itself, which takes up the sword in place of the pen, but does not on that account cease to think according to its own laws.²

If in the industrial nations economic and sociopolitical structure have deterministic influence on the nature and substance of military strategy, in Zaire the development of our military effectiveness will depend upon the level of our industrial development and the level of achievements in science and technology that we must gain abroad from our friends. F. Engels once emphasized: "Nothing is as dependent upon economic conditions as the army. Arms, troops, organization, tactics, and strategy depend above all else at any given moment on the level of production attained and on the means of communication."³ Marshal Mobutu Sese Seko also gave his thought on the role, and that capability that an army should have for maintaining the security and the defense of Zaire.

My anxiety is to make the Zairian army a strong army of deterrence, I have said it before and today I repeat it, Zaire had never wanted to threaten any other country, but Zaire will defend at high price its national integrity, to safeguard peace that it has dearly secured.⁴

We must consider that in peacetime the economy establishes the essential military-technical basis for waging a possible future war, it also determines the level of technical equipment of the armed forces, and thereby influences the status of the combat readiness and might of the armed forces for maintaining the security of a nation. In wartime, economic conditions pre-determine the nature and scale of the tasks which are assigned to the armed forces, as well as the possible range and intensity of military operations. In Zaire, our success to maintain and reinforce the security of our country will become reality only if we give a deep thought about the threats that our country faces from the neighboring states and if we have only a strong consideration for the coalition of economic-military resources of our nation that will lead us to create a national defense industry. I may add that one of the enduring lessons of history is that a nation unprepared to sustain its forces in the event of war suffers grievous consequences. A nation's security is a function of the degree of risk a country is willing to accept. This security requires increased and heavy cost, otherwise freedom will be easily obstructed or lost.

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